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I. INTRODUCTION
For at least a century, people have invoked the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination to resist subpoenas and other discovery requests for
documents they possess." The privilege is most commonly invoked to suppress
subpoenaed documents in civil and criminal proceedings involving the govern-
ment.2 Although corporations,3 partnerships, 4 and unincorporated associations
1. This Article does not address the issues arising when the claimant, i.e. the
person claiming the privilege in order to suppress the subpoenaed documents, did not
possess the documents at the time they were subpoenaed. A claimant generally cannot
suppress documents not in his possession at the time of the subpoena. Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 396-402 (1976); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 329-35
(1973). One exception arises, however, when the claimant's loss of possession is trivial
and temporary. Another exception arises when a recognized privilege, such as the attor-
ney-client privilege, exists between the claimant and the person in possession. Of
course, the claimant must still show that his documents would have been privileged had
they remained in his possession. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 405; Couch, 409 U.S. at 333.
These two exceptions, incidentally, are examples of rare situations in which the claim-
ant may raise the privilege even though the subpoena was not addressed to him; for the
most part, the privilege may only be raised by the person to whom the subpoena is
addressed.
Moreover, this Article deals only with the issues arising when the claimant pos-
sesses the documents in a personal as opposed to a representative capacity. When any
officer, director, employee or other agent of a business entity possesses subpoenaed doc-
uments in a representative capacity, the person cannot suppress the documents by
claiming the privilege, unless the business entity (such as a sole proprietor) can claim
the privilege against self incrimination. Instead, the person must submit the documents
to the document custodian of the business entity; if the subpoena addresses the person,
rather than the entity, the person must submit the documents to the party issuing the
subpoena. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 88 (1974) (Bellis was overruled in
United States v. Doe, 104 S. Ct. 1237 (1984)). Unfortunately, lower courts continue to
confuse the issue of whether documents are possessed in a personal or representative
capacity (a "possession, custody or control" dispute) with the issue of whether docu-
ments possessed in a personal capacity are protected by the privilege (a "fifth amend-
ment privilege" dispute). See, e.g., United States v. Mackey, 647 F.2d 898, 900 (9th
Cir. 1981) (wrongly suggesting that all documents held in a personal capacity are for
that reason protected by the privilege). This is a source of much confusion. See infra
note 5.
2. While few courts have explicitly held that a litigant in a private civil case
may suppress documents by claiming the privilege, fifth amendment jurisprudence has
long emphasized that the ability to use the privilege to suppress documents does not
turn on whether the government is a party, or on whether the case is civil or criminal.
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973) (privilege "applies alike to criminal and
civil proceedings"); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924) (same); see also
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886) (privilege protects documents in a
civil forfeiture action); Minnesota Bar Ass'n v. Divorce Assistance Ass'n, 311 Minn.
276, 278, 248 N.W.2d 733, 737 (1976) (privilege protects documents in a civil case for
injunctive relief); Rice v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 208 Okla. 440, 442, 257
P.2d 292, 294 (1953) (same); Stafford & Jackson, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimi-
nation in Federal Tax Investigations, 34 LA. L. REv. 703, 713-14 (1974) (privilege
equally available in civil and criminal cases); Note, The Constitutional Limits of Dis-
covery, 35 IND. L.J. 337, 341 (1960) (fifth amendment privilege to suppress documents
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do not have a fifth amendment privilege, a sole proprietor, however large, may
still use the privilege to suppress the business and personal documents in her
company's possession.'
Because an individual or a business operating as a sole proprietorship
both may suppress documents ranging from grocery lists to automobile repair
bills, they enjoy a substantial advafitage in litigation over entities denied the
in tax cases applies in civil audits). Compare Grant v. United States, 291 F.2d 227,
229 (2d Cir. 1961) (privilege protects documents in civil tax proceedings) with United
States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845, 852 (5th Cir. 1969) (privilege does not protect
documents in civil tax proceedings).
3. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906).
4. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 93-97 (1974); In re Mal Bros. Con-
tracting Co., 444 F.2d 615, 619 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971).
5. McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372, 380 (1960) (unincorporated politi-
cal organization); White v. United States, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944) (labor union).
This Article does not deal with the issue of whether particular documents, such as
desk calendars, are owned and possessed by an organizational entity which lacks the
privilege and therefore must be submitted when the subpoena is addressed to the entity.
To avoid submitting subpoenaed documents, an entity may claim that the documents
are "personal'-that is, that the documents are owned by some individual and are so
unrelated to the entity's business and so free of connection with the entity that they
should not be considered in the entity's ownership, possession, custody or control. See
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated April 28, 1981, 657 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir.
1981) (listing factors affecting possession, custody or control issue). This is, at bottom,
the same issue as whether an individual employee of an entity acts in a personal or
representative capacity. See supra note 1. When an entity calls documents "personal"
in a dispute over the entity's obligation to produce the documents, it means something
altogether different from the term "personal" as it is used in a fifth amendment dis-
pute. Mixing the two meanings of "personal" documents creates confusion. See, e.g.,
Comment, On Claiming the Fifth Amendment for Mixed Purpose Documents: The
Problem of Categorizing Documents as Personal or Corporate in a Business Setting,
17 U.S.F.L. REv. 333, 346-47 (1983) (confusing the two meanings of personal docu-
ments). Labeling the documents "personal" may still influence the ownership, posses-
sion, custody, or control issue, and thus bear on the entity's obligation to submit the
documents. But, as discussed infra, after Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976),
the ability of a subpoenaed person who possesses the documents in his personal capac-
ity to suppress them by claiming the privilege is no longer affected by whether the
documents are considered personal or business. Rather, the test is whether the implied
admissions from submitting the documents are sufficiently testimonial and incriminat-
ing. But see In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated April 28, 1981, 657 F.2d
5, 7 (2d Cir. 1981) (suggesting that documents that are personal rather than business
in nature are more likely to be suppressed and confusing the two meanings of personal
documents).
6. As recently as Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87-88 (1974), the Court
said that a sole proprietor could suppress all his documents: "The privilege applies to
the business records of the sole proprietor as well as to personal documents containing
more intimate information about the individual's private life." While the later opinion
in Fisher logically contradicts this statement from Bellis and severely restricts the abil-
ity of a sole proprietor to suppress documents, many courts continue to allow sole pro-
prietors to suppress all business documents. See infra notes 14, 170 & 173.
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privilege. This advantage is exploited most often to impede grand jury and tax
investigations.7 For example, a grand jury investigating price-fixing will rou-
tinely subpoena documents from several suspected competitors. All but the
sole proprietorship must comply. This ability to suppress documents, which
often supply crucial evidence in a price-fixing prosecution, may in practice
virtually eliminate the sole proprietorship's antitrust exposure. In general, the
ability to suppress documents allows individuals and sole proprietorships to
resist attacks on their white collar crimes and civil offenses.
During the nineteenth century, the reasons for protecting documents
under the privilege sprang from the notion that an owner's indefeasible natural
law property rights put his property absolutely beyond the reach of the govern-
ment or other litigants, at least while it remained in his possession.8 All prop-
erty to which the government or other litigants could not claim paramount
property rights remained beyond the reach of even the most carefully drawn
subpoena. The minor interference in possessory interests resulting from using a
person's property as evidence was not tolerated. Using a person's property
against him in a criminal case was equated with compelling him to utter an
incriminating statement. 9
The property rights rationale for suppressing documents waned after
1945, and a somewhat related privacy rationale arose. Under this rationale,
the privilege must protect certain documents in order to safeguard a person's
"legitimate expectations of privacy" and his "private enclave where he may
lead a private life."10 In 1976, the Supreme Court in Fisher v. United States"
rejected the privacy rationale and adopted the implied admissions rationale
long espoused by Wigmore." Under this rationale, the privilege does not pro-
tect any voluntarily prepared documents as such; it only prohibits compelling a
person to utter self-incriminating testimony. The only reason a person may
refuse to submit subpoenaed documents, therefore, is that the act of submit-
ting the documents carries with it implied, self-incriminating admissions. Spe-
cifically, submitting documents in compliance with a subpoena impliedly ad-
mits that the documents exist and were in the claimant's possession at the time
the subpoena was served. These unspoken admissions may incriminate by, for
7. E.g., United States v. Doe, 104 S. Ct. 1237, 1239 (1984) (grand jury inves-
tigation of corruption in awarding municipal contracts).
8. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627-28 (1886); see also Gouled v.
United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921).
9. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 634-35.
10. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 91 (1974); Couch v. United States,
409 U.S. 322, 336 (1973) ("legitimate expectation of privacy"); Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) ("private enclave where he may lead a private life")
(quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J.,
dissenting)).
11. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
12. Id. at 410-14; see 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §
2264, at 380 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961); see also United States v. Doe, 104 S. Ct.
1237, 1242 (1984) (reaffirmed committment to implied admission theory).
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example, authenticating the genuineness of the documents. When these admis-
sions sufficiently incriminate, the privilege's ban against compelling the admis-
sions requires the suppression of the documents.13 Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court's standard for suppression is so dubious and difficult to apply that
Fisher's practical effect has largely been nullified.1 4 As a result, individuals
and sole proprietorships generally remain able to suppress documents in their
possession.
This Article reviews the protection that the privilege has given documents
and the mischief that has resulted. It contends that Fisher forces upon the
lower courts a standard pettifogging in principle and unworkable in practice.
It argues for a standard which would enforce subpoenas for documents over a
claim of privilege in almost every instance.15 It then explains how that excep-
tional instance when the claim of privilege should be upheld, and the docu-
ments suppressed, can be identified.
13. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 412 n.12.
14. Fisher has produced utter confusion in the lower courts. See note 170 infra.
Nevertheless, most persons have remained able to suppress their documents. See, e.g.,
United States v. Helena, 549 F.2d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 1977) (subpoena quashed and all
documents suppressed); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Ducus Tecum Served Upon John
Doe, 466 F. Supp. 325, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (same); see also In re Berstein, 425 F.
Supp. 37, 39 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (tape of telephone conversation suppressed). Fisher's
shortcomings are compounded by uncertainty over the procedures for responding to
subpoenas. See note 173 infra.
15. While I argue that the privilege should not allow the suppression of docu-
ments in any criminal or civil proceedings, admittedly arguments exist for various in-
termediate positions. One intermediate position would allow use of the privilege to sup-
press documents only in civil cases involving the government and in criminal
proceedings. This position compensates for the greater hardship imposed on a private
litigant who cannot obtain the key documents as compared to the government litigant
which can always obtain the documents (albeit at a high price) by granting the claim-
ant use immunity. This position also avoids the danger that the government, in a civil
case, could circumvent the the carefully drawn limits on criminal discovery. Unfortu-
nately, this position collides with the long standing rule that the availability of the
privilege should not turn on whether the case is civil or criminal or upon whether the
government is a party.
A second intermediate position would deny use of the privilege to suppress the
business documents of a sole proprietorship. This position gains support from the rule
denying the privilege to partnerships and other unincorporated associations, and from
the Court's insistence in Bellis that the availability of the privilege should not turn on
insubstantial differences in the form of a business enterprise. See Bellis v. United
States, 417 U.S. 85, 101 (1974). This position, however, forces a lower court to scruti-
nize each document to determine whether it concerns the claimant's proprietorship or
his personal life. That the document relates to a financial matter does not reduce the
court's burden, for the financial matter may be unrelated to the proprietorship. In cases
involving large numbers of documents, this burden may be prohibitive. Moreover, in
other contexts the Court has refused to allow individuals to suppress all documents
concerning their personal life. Cf. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 441 (1976)
(personal checks and documents not immune from search and seizure).
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II. PROTECTING DOCUMENTS THEMSELVES
Understanding the current law on this subject requires exploring the past.
Until Fisher,16 a person's documents, as such, were said to be protected by the
fifth amendment privilege. In other words, a person who, by subpoena, was
requested to submit documents in his possession could refuse to do so, not
because the act of submitting the documents amounted to testimony, but be-
cause the documents themselves, although prepared voluntarily, were consid-
ered privileged materials. As mentioned earlier, the courts advanced two ratio-
nales for this rule: the first based on the right of property; and the second,
which evolved from the first, based on the right of privacy.
Although the Supreme Court never acknowledged that these rationales
differed, or that one replaced the other,1 7 the two rationales reflected different
views about the purpose of the self-incrimination privilege and about the
proper relation between the government and the individual. Of more practical
importance, the rationales, whatever their defects, spawned cases that still in-
fluence courts. In theory, the two rationales also produced different tests for
deciding which documents would be suppressed. While, under the property
rights rationale, a recipient of a subpoena could suppress almost all the docu-
ments he owned, under the privacy rationale he could suppress only those doc-
uments in which he maintained an expectation of privacy, either because he
authored the documents and had kept them secret, or because the documents
concerned his intimate personal matters and had been circulated to only a few.
In reality, the two rationales led to the same result.
A. The Property Rights Rationale
The notion that owning property necessarily entails the right to suppress
the property from all investigators would impede law enforcement, at least
against the wealthy, to an extent considered intolerable today. Applied
broadly, this notion would, for example, bar investigators from examining the
property of a corporation suspected of a crime. To see that this notion gave
birth to the rule protecting documents, and to see that the cases celebrating
this notion are still cited with approval, is to appreciate the extent to which
this corner of the law is governed by the dead hand of the past.
The rule that the privilege protects documents stems from Boyd v. United
States.18 Boyd involved a forfeiture action in rem to seize thirty-five cases of
glass on the grounds that they had been imported without paying the pre-
scribed duty. The government subpoenaed from the partners, who had im-
ported the glass, an invoice showing their previous purchase of twenty-nine
other cases.
16. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
17. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87-93 (1974) (equating the
rationales).
18. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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The Supreme Court, emphasizing the partners' property right to the in-
voice, held that compelling the partners to submit it amounted to a trespass on
their property; such a trespass, like any interference with property rights, vio-
lated the fifth amendment. Justice Bradley, quoting Lord Camden's famous
opinion in Entick v. Carrington,1" set forth the policy for the property right
rationale in epic terms:
The great end for which men entered into society was to secure their prop-
erty. That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable in all instances
where it has not been taken away or abridged by some public law for the good
of the whole. . . . By the laws of England, every invasion of private property,
be it ever so minute, is a trespass.20
That the government obtained the invoice through a subpoena and not through
a seizure did not reduce the trespass:
It is not . . . the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of
the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of. . . private prop-
erty, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some pub-
lic offense-it is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and consti-
tutes the essence of Lord Camden's judgment .. . Breaking into a house and
opening boxes in drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but any forceable
and compulsory extortion of a man's . . . private papers to be used as evi-
dence of a crime or to forfeit his goods is within the condemnation of that
judgment. 1
19. Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765).
20. 116 U.S. at 627-28 (quoting Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1066, Eng. Rep. at
817). Lord Carrington's orientation toward property rights reflected ancient anteced-
ents. See E. COKE, FOURTH INSTITUTE 176-77 (1797); 2 J. GABBET, CRIMINAL LAW
156-57 (1843); 2 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 113-14, 149-51 (1736). Several
eighteenth century cases suggested that the common law privilege against self-incrimi-
nation extended to protection against submission of documents. See, e.g., Roe v. Har-
vey, 98 Eng. Rep. 302, 305 (K.B. 1769); King v. Purnell, 95 Eng. Rep. 595, 597 (K.B.
1748); King v. Cornelius, 93 Eng. Rep. 1133, 1134 (K.B. 1744).
21. 116 U.S. at 630. Others have pointed out that Bradley's views exemplify the
formalist jurisprudence of the late nineteenth century in its absolute protection of indi-
vidual rights rooted in natural law. The right to hold private property was perhaps the
most significant of these rights. See Note, Formalism, Legal Realism and Constitu-
tionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 945, 948-52 (1977). This Note offered an impeccable explanation of Boyd's philo-
sophic background; while the cases did not reflect the literal or mechanic method asso-
ciated with formalism, see, e.g, Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REv.
605 (1908), it did reflect formalism's substantive values. Note, supra, at 948.
The Note states incorrectly, however, that Boyd protected documents based on
their content. Id. at 967-69. In fact, Justice Bradley was indifferent to this. 116 U.S. at
624. The Note equates the property right concern in Boyd with concern for protecting
a person's reasonable expectation of privacy. Nevertheless, the notion that privilege
protects this expectation, while tangentially related to the protection of property rights,
came much later than Boyd and carried different implications. See text accompanying
notes 64-73 infra; cf. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300-09 (1967) (substituted
privacy rationale for property rationale to allow seizure of purely evidentiary
materials).
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Significantly, the government seizures of private property which occurred dur-
ing executions and forfeitures were only justified because the party seeking the
property claimed a property right superior to that of the possessor.22
Because the privilege, in order to protect the possessor's property rights,
condemned such subpoenas, neither the content, purpose, authorship, circula-
tion nor incriminatory nature of the invoice affected the decision to suppress.
In fact, this invoice had not been prepared by the partners, but by the sellers,
the Union Plate and Glass Company. Moreover, a statute required the part-
nership to keep the invoice and to present it at the customs office when the
glass was imported.2 s In short, the invoice related only to business matters,
had not been authored by either of the two partners subpoenaed or by their
employees, had previously been revealed to public officials and had been pre-
pared and kept pursuant to a statutory requirement. Under the standards
which were to develop ninety years later when the privacy rationale pre-
vailed, 2' each of these facts would preclude characterizing the invoice as the
private papers of the partners. Although the Court in Boyd repeatedly called
the invoice the "private" paper of the partners, it only meant that the invoice
was the partners' private property.26 As long as a purpose of the subpoena was
to obtain a person's property to use against him in a criminal case the fifth
amendment was offended.26 A search and seizure for this purpose was inher-
22. 116 U.S. at 628. As in fourth amendment jurisprudence, the category of
items to which the government could claim a superior property interest widened quick-
ly to include instrumentalities and contraband, but not mere evidence. Gouled v.
United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309-10 (1921); see also Marron v. United States, 275
U.S. 192, 199 (1927) (ledgers and bills considered instrumentalities). But see United
States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465 (1932) (papers are not instrumentalities).
23. Id. at 619. The importer was required to produce the original invoice to the
collector at the point of arrival. Act of July 31, 1789; General Regulations under the
Customs and Navigation Laws, arts. 314-334 (1884); see Shapiro v. United States, 335
U.S. 1, 68-69 & n.19 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
24. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 92 (1974); Couch v. United States,
409 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973).
25. Nevertheless, cases have cited Boyd as a landmark decision protecting "pri-
vacy" and have erroneously suggested that Bradley was striving to protect the partner's
expectations of privacy. See, e.g., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 91-92 (1974);
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 348 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
obvious concern of the [Boyd] case [was] the desire of the author of documents to keep
them private.").
26. 116 U.S. at 632. In practice, Boyd has allowed many more documents to be
suppressed than the property rights rationale required. One reason is that, while the
subpoena in Boyd called for a single invoice which was already before the court, sub-
poenas in later cases often called for many documents described only by subject matter,
making document review of their ownership wholly impractical. Indeed, no clear rule
ever emerged to indicate how to apply Boyd when a broad subpoena for documents was
answered simply with a motion to quash based on the privilege. Was the trial court to
obtain the documents in order to determine ownership or would this inspection itself
violate the privilege? Not surprisingly, judges rarely attempted to determine ownership;
thus, the person subpoenaed could generally suppress all documents in his possession
without any realistic danger of the privilege claim being overruled. E.g., Ballman v.
446 [Vol. 49
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ently "unreasonable" and hence violated the fourth amendment as well.17
Perhaps because of Justice Bradley's grandiloquent appeal to resist any
encroachments on individual rights, Boyd exerted tremendous influence. 28 His
assumption that the chief aim of human society is the preservation of property
rights neither raised the skepticism nor diminished the enthusiasm of modern
courts.
Boyd was soon clarified to require possession as well as ownership. In
Perlman v. United States,29 the Court upheld the use of a person's documents
against him when he had voluntarily submitted them to the government and
only later had invoked the privilege to block their use. Because the owner re-
tained a superior property right to the documents, the property orientation
suggested by Boyd"0 would have required the government to return the docu-
ments as soon as the owner requested them. The Court, perhaps realizing that
property rights should be modified in the interest of proving crimes, read Boyd
merely to protect a person from having to submit his property: "the criterion
of immunity [is] not the ownership of property but the "physical or moral
compulsion exerted." 3' Because the claimant had voluntarily submitted the
documents, no compulsion had been exerted. Although Perlman undermined
much of Boyd's rationale,32 Boyd could be reconciled because the partnership
Fagen, 200 U.S. 186, 195-96 (1906).
Occasionally, however, the wording of a subpoena indicated that it called for docu-
ments which were not owned by the subpoenaed party. Then the claimants motion to
quash could not be granted outright; some inquiry into ownership was necessary. This
most often occurred when a person was subpoenaed to produce corporate documents.
See Dreir v. United States, 221 U.S. 394, 400 (1911); Sanford v. United States, 358
F.2d 685, 685 (5th Cir. 1966); Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451, 458 (8th Cir.
1963); United States v. Guterma, 174 F. Supp. 581, 582-83 (E.D.N.Y. 1959).
Similarly, when the "required records" exception to Boyd was established, some
subpoenas indicated that only "required records" were being sought. Then the motion
to quash would not be granted without some inquiry into whether the claimant's
records fell into the required records exception. See United States v. Turner, 480 F.2d
272, 278 (7th Cir. 1973) (required records of tax preparers produced); United States v.
Silverman, 449 F.2d 1341, 1345 (2d Cir. 1971) (records required to be filed by attor-
neys with the state judiciary produced), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972); United
States v. Kaufman, 429 F.2d 240, 247 (2d Cir. 1970) (required records of broker-
dealer produced), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). See generally Shapiro v. United
States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948) (establishing "required records" exception); text accompany-
ing notes 45-49 infra.
27. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
28. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) ("a case that will be remembered as long as civil liberty lives in the
United States"); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 776 (1966) (Black, J., dissent-
ing) ("among the greatest constitutional decisions of this Court").
29. 247 U.S. 7 (1918).
30. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 638.
31. Perlman, 247 U.S. at 15.
32. Perlman implicitly overruled the language in Boyd that equated obtaining
and using a person's documents against him with compelling him to testify against
himself. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633. In Perlman, the documents were obtained and
1984]
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had possessed the invoice and had been compelled to submit it. Ownership and
possession had coalesced.3 3 In Perlman, as in Boyd, the Court found no reason
to consider the document's contents, subject matter, authorship, extent of cir-
culation, or incriminatory character. As long as the person subpoenaed pos-
sessed the property, and either owned it or held a property interest superior to
the party issuing the subpoena, he could suppress it.3 4
Appreciating the property orientation of Boyd helps to explain later docu-
ment submission decisions that still operate. For instance, a bankrupt may not
use the privilege to suppress the documents of his business, because title to the
documents passes to the trustee during bankruptcy proceedings. 35 Similarly, a
corporate president may not suppress documents he authored and possesses if
they are owned by the corporation.36 Although ownership is logically irrelevant
used against the claimant, over his objection, when they were introduced into evidence.
Had the equation held, this would have violated the privilege, and the claimant would
not have needed to show any other compulsion.
33. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. Boyd did not clarify whether the compulsion it con-
demned resulted from introducing the claimant's property as evidence against him over
his objection or in forcing him to transfer possession of the property to those issuing the
subpoena. Perlman condemned only the forced transfer of possession. Insofar as forcing
the transfer of possession interferes more with the claimant's possessory interest in the
property, Perlman remains consistent with a property rights emphasis.
34. In accordance with the property right rationale, the remedy for the illegal
subpoena or seizure of papers included their prompt return to the owner. Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
35. Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913). Professor Mayers has
pointed out the formalistic result that this rationale produces:
While the bankrupt under examination may, on the plea that they contain
criminatory entries, withhold his books from the court, he may not withhold
them from the trustee in bankruptcy. . . . The reason why the bankrupt may
not withhold his criminatory records from the trustee is that the books and
papers of his business are part of the property which the law requires him to
surrender to the trustee. "To permit him to retain possession because surren-
der might involve disclosure of a crime, would," the Supreme Court has ex-
plained, "destroy a property right." If, as the Court seemed to feel in
. . .[Boyd], the right to withhold incriminating documents from the courts is
one of the sacred rights for which patriots fought and bled, is it not something
like pettifogging to destroy that right by invoking the technical property right
of the trustee . . . ?
L. MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT? 145 (1959) (citation
omitted).
36. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 378 (1911) (when corporation is
subpoenaed, corporation president must submit corporate documents in his possession
to the document custodian for the corporation). Because ownership was critical the
Wilson Court discussed which documents were Wilson's and which were the
corporation's:
The copies of letters written by the president of the corporation in the course
of its transactions were as much a part of its documentary property, . . . as
its ledgers and minute books. It was said in the appellant's statement before
the Grand Jury that the books contained copies of his 'personal and other
correspondence as well as copies of the correspondence relating to the busi-
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under the currently prevailing implied admissions rationale, lower court opin-
ions emphasizing that a person must own documents in order to suppress them
are too frequent and recent to be assumed invalid.37
On one major issue, however, Boyd's property orientation carried implica-
tions which the Court could not accept. Logically, Boyd would suppress prop-
erty owned by corporations as well as by natural persons. So applied, it would
jeopardize the efforts of the government to pursue corporate crimes and civil
offenses to an extent that may have been considered politically unacceptable.
To limit Boyd, the Court needed to find a basis for treating property owned by
corporations differently from property owned by individuals. In Hale v. Hen-
kel, 8 the Court, after citing natural law, the social contract, and the rights-
privilege distinction, ultimately relied on the "visitatorial powers" of the state
to inspect the property and records of state corporations. 39
ness and affairs' of the corporation. But his personal letters were not de-
manded. These the subpoena did not seek to reach; and as to these no ques-
tion of violation of privilege is presented. Plainly he could not make these
books his private or personal books by keeping copies of personal letters in
them.
221 U.S. 361, 377-78 (1911).
A major effect of Wilson was to ensure that subpoenas addressed to organizational
entities would not be frustrated by claims that the employees were keeping the organi-
zation's documents from the custodian in charge of complying with the subpoena. Wil-
son clarified that when the organization was subpoenaed, all employees must allow the
custodian to examine the organization's files and produce responsive documents. One
should not assume from Wilson, however, that an individual who is subpoenaed would
be unable to suppress documents he did not own. While in theory ownership was a
necessary condition for suppression, in practice the impracticality of a review of owner-
ship by the court meant that an individual would generally be able to suppress all
documents he possessed unless the subpoena expressly asked for documents he did not
own. See note 26 supra.
37. E.g., United States v. Falley, 489 F.2d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 1973) (ownership
essential for suppression); United States v. Egenberg, 443 F.2d 512, 517-18 (3d Cir.
1971) (same). But see United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 1967)(holding that possession was sufficient). An occasional case suggesting that a person
can suppress all documents he possesses but does not own illustrates the confusion en-
gendered by the emphasis on ownership. E.g., United States v. Kleckner, 273 F. Supp.
251, 252 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
Through the rubric that the documents are held in a "representative capacity,"
partial, undivided ownership is insufficient. See United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S.
349, 357-58 (1950) (documents of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee com-
pelled from a member); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1951) (same
result for the Denver Communist Party).
38. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
39.
[An individual] owes no duty to the State or to his neighbors to divulge his
business, or to open his doors to an investigation, so far as it may tend to
criminate him. He owes no such duty to the State, since he receives nothing
therefrom, beyond the protection of his life and property. His rights are such
as existed by the law of the land long antecedent to the organization of the
State.. ..
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Use of the visitatorial powers concept in Hale allowed Boyd's absolute
protection of property rights to remain intact. In contrast, an approach sug-
gesting the corporation's property rights should be balanced against, and on
occasion yield to, law enforcement interests would have implicitly challenged
an absolute rule. Not until 1944, in White v. United States,40 did the Court
acknowledge that the reason production of documents of organizations could
be compelled was not so much title or visitation rights, but the fear that other-
wise the privilege would be too potent an instrument for covering up business
crimes.41
B. From Property Rights to Privacy-The Search for a Rationale
In retrospect, the property rights rationale, which reflected the absolute
protection of rights associated with legal formalism, was not likely to survive
the era of legal realism. During its slow demise over eighty years, the property
rights rationale was confined with increasingly unprincipled distinctions. The
distinctions then evolved into a rationale more compatible with legal realism,
the privacy rationale. If only because the cases decided along the way still
exert influence, the evolution toward the privacy rationale warrants attention.
Discontent with the property rights rationale surfaced early. In 1910, in
Holt v. United States, 42 Justice Holmes noted that while the language of the
privilege forbade compelling a person to testify against himself, it did not for-
bid compelling and using his property against him.43 Because, at common law,
a person held a property interest in his own body, the logic of Boyd would
forbid compelling a person to appear in court and to allow the use of his body
as evidence against him. In upholding an order compelling a criminal defen-
Upon the other hand, the corporation is a creature of the State. It is
presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. . . . There is a
reserved right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out
whether it has exceeded its power.
201 U.S. at 74-75.
40. 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
41.
The scope and nature of the economic activities of incorporated and unincor-
porated organizations and their representatives demand that the constitutional
power of the federal and state governments to regulate those activities be cor-
respondingly effective. The greater portion of evidence of wrongdoing by an
organization or its representatives is usually to be found in the official records
and documents of that organization. Were the cloak of the privilege to be
thrown around these impersonal records and documents, effective enforcement
of many federal and state laws would be impossible.
322 U.S. at 700.
42. 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
43. Id. at 251-52; see U.S. CoNsT. amend. V ("[N]or shall [any person] be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."). In contrast, some
state constitutions contain language that forbids compelling a person to give "evidence"
against himself, language that might protect more than just testimony. Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 761-62 n.6 (1966).
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dant to wear a blouse in court, Justice Holmes avoided the logic of Boyd and
stated the view that would prevail only much later: "The prohibition of com-
pelling a man in a criminal case to be a witness against himself is the prohibi-
tion of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from
him. . . -4 Under this view, neither documents nor any other property which
a person had voluntarily prepared or kept could be suppressed. Nevertheless,
cases in the 1920's, such as Gouled v. United States,45 simply reasserted the
property rights approach for documents and other property, an approach that
prevailed for at least thirty years.
The evolution from property rights to privacy in fourth amendment law is
a familiar story and suggests the direction of a similar evolution of the fifth
amendment. One implication of Boyd was that a person's property was also
protected under the fourth amendment from any search and seizure. Following
Boyd, property in a person's possession to which he did not enjoy superior title,
such as stolen property, received no fourth amendment protection. 46 The ex-
ception for stolen property was gradually expanded to allow seizure of any
property which the private citizen was not permitted to possess, including con-
traband and instrumentalities of crime. 47
In Warden v. Hayden48 in 1967, the Supreme Court severed the fourth
amendment from the property rights heritage of Boyd. Hayden presented the
issue of whether the defendant's clothing, mere evidence of a crime and not an
instrumentality or contraband, could constitutionally be seized. The Court rec-
ognized that because the government was not able to assert a superior prop-
erty right in the clothing, Boyd and its progeny would condemn the seizure. 49
It then correctly traced the property right approach to Entick v. Carrington
and the view that protecting property rights was the chief aim of human soci-
ety.50 It deemed the notion that property rights controlled the fourth amend-
44. Holt, 218 U.S. at 252-53.
45. 255 U.S. 298 (1921). Gouled involved a prosecution against clothing and
equipment suppliers for conspiring to defraud the government. One defendant moved to
suppress under the privilege documents taken from him surreptitiously, but without
force. The Court noted that the papers enjoyed no special sanctity as distinguished
from other forms of property. Under the Court's view, the government needed to show
a superior property right to the papers. The fact that the papers were needed for evi-
dence would not warrant seizing them or compelling their production: "In either case
[claimant] is the unwilling source of the evidence, and the Fifth Amendment forbids
that he shall be compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal case." Id. at
306.
46. Gouled, 255 U.S. at 304; see note 20 supra.
47. United States v. Guido, 251 F.2d 1, 34 (7th Cir. 1958) (instrumentali-
ties-shoes); Morton v. United States, 147 F.2d 28, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (instrumental-
ities-blood-stained clothes and liquor bottle). See generally Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 301-04 (1957).
48. 387 U.S. 294 (1957).
49. Id. at 301-03.
50.
The common law of search and seizure after Entick v. Carrington ...re-
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ment to be "discredited." 1 A different goal for the fourth amendment was
embraced: "We have recognized that the principal object of the Fourth
Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property, and have in-
creasingly discarded fictional and procedural barriers rested on property con-
cepts." 52 In light of the government's interest in obtaining the clothing and the
protections given the defendant by the warrant procedure, the relatively mod-
est harm to the defendant's privacy interests from seizing the clothing did not
require suppression.
After Hayden, one might have expected an equally clean break from the
property rights rationale in fifth amendment jurisprudence. As the technology
for copying documents improved, the interference with a person's property
rights that resulted from compelling him to part with subpoenaed documents,
even for the duration of a lengthy investigation, became de minimus. Such
interference rarely justified the harm to the law enforcement interests in ob-
taining evidence caused by the suppression of the documents. Nevertheless, the
rejection of the property rights approach in fifth amendment jurisprudence
took a more serpentine path.
The first inroad came in the so-called "required records" rule. One impli-
cation of the property rights approach was that a person could be required to
produce documents or property in his possession that were owned by the pub-
lic. For instance, a person could be compelled to produce state-owned records
that he was required to prepare and keep in the course of his duties. 3 In
Shapiro v. United States," the Court, over substantial dissent, challenged the
property rights framework. The Court allowed compelled production of
records which were "required by statute to be kept," even though such records
might be owned by the claimant.5
flected Lord Camden's view, derived no doubt from the political thought of
his time, that the "great end, for which men entered into society, was to se-
cure their property." ...Warrants were "allowed only when the primary
right to such a search and seizure is in the interest which the public or com-
plainant may have in the property seized." ...No separate governmental
interest in seizing evidence to apprehend and convict criminals was recog-
nized; it was required that some property interest be asserted.
Id. at 303 (citations omitted).
51. Id. at 304.
52. Id. Shifting the emphasis from property rights to privacy did not represent a
restriction of fourth amendment protection. For example, under the privacy rationale, a
person no longer needed to own property to claim that its seizure was illegal. See, e.g.,
United States ex rel. DeForte v. Mancusi, 379 F.2d 897, 901-02 (2d Cir. 1967), aff'd
sub nom., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
53. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 591-94, (1946); Wilson v. United
States, 221 U.S. 361, 380 (1911).
54. 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
55. Shapiro involved a prosecution for violation of the Emergency Price Control
Act. The government subpoenaed from one suspected of tie-in sales "all duplicate sales
invoices, sales books, ledgers, inventory records, contracts and records relating to the
sale of all commodities from September 1, 1944 to September 29, 1944." Id. at 4. The
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In Shapiro, the government had subpoenaed records that the suspect had
been required to keep under price control legislation. Justice Vinson's opinion
for the court glossed over the key issue of ownership. He relied upon dicta
from Wilson v. United States suggesting that documents "required by law to
be kept" were unprivileged. 6 The government interest in the documents, man-
ifested by the statute, showed that such records carried sufficient "public as-
pects" to justify compelling their submission.
Justice Frankfurter's lengthy dissent in Shapiro clarified the move away
from the property rights approach. He emphasized that previous cases had
found required records unprivileged only when the records were publicly
owned. 57 Requiring records to be kept does not transfer ownership to the pub-
lic. Accordingly, the majority was ignoring Boyd's property approach, a move
"far reaching in its implications involving . ..a drastic change in the rela-
tions between the individual and the Government as hitherto conceived." 58
If property rights no longer controlled the application of the privilege to
documents, what did control? The references in Shapiro to the public aspects
of required records suggested a new concern with the document's subject mat-
ter and the reason for the document's preparation, as well as with the govern-
ment's interest in obtaining such documents. The government always possesses
a strong law enforcement interest in obtaining documents with an incrimina-
Price Control Act required the claimant to keep these records.
56. Justice Vinson stated:
The principle [that a custodian has no privilege as to the documents in his
custody] applies not only to public documents in public offices but also to
records required by law to be kept in order that there may be suitable infor-
mation of transactions which are the appropriate subjects of governmental
regulation and the enforcement of restrictions validly established.
335 U.S. at 17 (quoting Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 380 (1911)).
57. Justice Frankfurter acknowledged that the dicta in Wilson, on which the
majority relied, appeared to oppose a strict property rights limitation. As he explained,
however, the Wilson court was only saying that a document custodian of a corporation
can be compelled to submit the corporation's records. 335 U.S. at 58-65 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting). The Wilson Court never suggested that an individual can be compelled
to submit his own records whenever a statute requires those records to be kept.
58. Id. Frankfurter went on to state that:
The underlying assumption of the Court's opinion is that all records which
Congress in the exercise of its constitutional powers may require individuals
to keep in the conduct of their affairs, because those affairs also have aspects
of public interest, become "public" records in the sense that they fall outside
the constitutional protection of the Fifth Amendment. ...
If the records in controversy here are in fact public, in the sense of pub-
licly owned, or governmental, records, their non-privileged status fol-
lows. . . .No one has a private right to keep for his own use the contents of
such records. But the notion that whenever Congress requires an individual to
keep in a particular form his own books dealing with his own affairs his
records cease to be his when he is accused of a crime, is indeed startling.
Id. at 53-54 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citing Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582,
594, 602 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
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tory subject matter. Yet the majority did not say that it would allow compul-
sion of all incriminating documents; its holding was limited to documents re-
quired to be maintained by statute. What subject matter and what government
interests might give other documents a "public aspect" preventing suppression
remained unclear.
The eighteen years after Shapiro brought a flood of fifth amendment liti-
gation concerning testimony but little new concerning the fifth amendment
and documents. Nevertheless, the new cases undermined the property rights
rationale, if only because they led the Court to identify policies favoring the
privilege other than the protection of property rights. In Murphy v. Water-
front Commission," Justice Goldberg summarized seven policies identified by
the history of the privilege and recent cases.60 Commentators reorganized
Goldberg's policies into three categories: the "foxhunter" policies of discourag-
ing torture and browbeating and maintaining a fair state-individual balance of
advantages in criminal proceedings, the "old woman's" policy of avoiding the
cruel "trilemma" of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt, and the "hermit's"
policy of preserving a private enclave where one may lead a private life. 1
These policies remained the acknowledged justifications for the privilege until
at least 1976.62
59. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
60. Justice Goldberg stated:
[The privilege] reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspi-
rations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accu-
satorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that
self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and
abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates "a fair state-individual balance
by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is
shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with
the individual to shoulder the entire load," 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaugh-
ton rev., 1961), 317; our respect for the inviolability of the human personality
and of the right of each individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a
private life," United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (Frank, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements;
and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes "a shelter to the
guilty," is often a "protection to the innocent." Quinn v. United States, 349
U.S. 155, 162.
378 U.S. at 55.
61. E.g., Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitu-
tional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 686 (1968); O'Brien, The Fifth Amendment:
Fox Hunters, Old Women, Hermits and the Burger Court, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 26,
27 (1978); see also McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 Sup. CT.
REV. 193, 213-14 ("[F]rom all the welter of the reasons given . . .[for] the privilege
...only two have. . . force. . .: (1) preservation of official morality, and (2) preser-
vation of individual privacy.").
62. One exception is the Court's abandonment of the claim that the privilege
helped protect the innocent. See Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406,
415 (1966).
In 1976, in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 399-401 (1976), the Court
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Murphy said nothing about the need to protect property rights or about
the invasion of property rights caused by compelling a person to submit his
property in response to a subpoena. Nor did the policies mentioned in Murphy,
save perhaps privacy, overlap with Bradley's concerns in Boyd. Bradley's fail-
ure to mention the foxhunter or old woman's policies in Boyd, although Ben-
tham had described them as early as 1820,3 suggests the fundamental differ-
ence between the new view of the privilege and Bradley's property rights
rationale. While Bradley saw the privilege as a substantive rule to assure the
absolute protection of property rights required by natural law, the new view,
borrowing from Bentham, saw the privilege as a procedural rule to combat the
conduct of police and prosecutors.
Two years later, the Court in Schmerber v. California,64 relying on the
policies listed in Murphy, drew a distinction which was fundamentally incom-
patible with the property right approach, and which logically should have en-
ded the protection of documents. Schmerber concerned whether the privilege
allowed a suspect to refuse a blood test. The suspect argued that compelling
him to submit a sample of his blood to be used against him offended the prop-
erty rights approach of Boyd. Because the Court had long held that a person's
property interest in his body was not the kind of property interest deserving
protection,65 lower courts had upheld compelling a person to submit to "finger-
printing, photographing or measurements, to write or speak for identification,
to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particu-
lar gesture."6 6 Thus, the conclusion that the blood test could be compelled did
not require a major conceptual shift. 67 Nevertheless, Justice Brennan an-
nounced a critical distinction between testimonial evidence and non-testimo-
nial evidence. Real or physical evidence, like the blood sample, was non-testi-
monial and could be compelled.6" Under this test, ownership of the evidence,
stopped claiming the privilege protected privacy, except as a by-product of its protec-
tion against compelling incriminating testimony.
63. See J. BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in 7 THE WORKS OF JER-
EMY BENTHAM 446-47 (J. Bowring ed. 1843).
64. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
65. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910).
66. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764.
67. Compelling an accused to submit to a blood test to produce evidence against
him does contradict the policy of maintaining a purely adversary system, in which the
accused need not contribute to his own conviction. Schmerber illustrates, therefore,
that the policies of Murphy will not be pushed to their logical limits and that much
fifth amendment jurisprudence will turn on the degree to which the policies are of-
fended. As Justice Brennan conceded, the scope of the privilege does not coincide "with
the complex of values its helps to protect." Id. at 762.
68. The Court stated:
Not even a shadow of testimonial compulsion upon or enforced communica-
tion by the accused was involved either in the extraction or in the chemical
analysis. Petitioner's testimonial capacities were in no way implicated; indeed,
his participation, except as a donor, was irrelevant to the results of the test,
which depend on chemical analysis and on that alone.
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so critical to the property rights rationale, was immaterial. The privilege now
applied only when the government was compelling self-incriminatory testi-
mony. It aimed at preventing government agents from compelling a person to
speak against himself. Obtaining evidence against a subject through "the cruel
simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth" 6 exemplified the pro-
cedures the privilege now discouraged. The Court's testimonial/nontestimonial
distinction made the ownership of the evidence, so critical to the property
rights rationale, immaterial.
Logically, the testimonial/non-testimonial distinction of Schmerber
should have swept away the notion that the privilege protects any documents
prepared voluntarily before the subpoena was issued. Such documents are like
any other real or physical evidence a person might own. Compelling a person
to submit these documents, in response to a subpoena, requires nothing more
than compelling him to submit any other property in his possession. 70 Docu-
ments prepared in the past, unlike documents a suspect is compelled by the
government to write at the police station, are not the product of coercive ques-
tioning. Any communications they might contain would not be compelled com-
munications. Yet Justice Brennan in a perplexing passage, insisted that docu-
ments, unlike other real or physical evidence, should remain protected. Citing
Boyd, he concluded that "the protection of the privilege reaches an accused
communication, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of re-
sponses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a sub-
poena to produce one's papers . ''7
The reliance on Boyd seems seriously misplaced. Boyd did not emphasize
a distinction between documents and other property. Beyond that, the passage
contains two glaring flaws. First, Justice Brennan erroneously assumes that all
of one's papers contain a person's communications. Yet many papers a person
owns will only contain communications by others. The invoice in Boyd, for
example, had been prepared by the shipping company and did not contain any
communications of the claimant. His reasoning also overlooks the lack of gov-
ernment compulsion in the preparation of the documents. Compelling the sub-
mission of documents is not equivalent to compelling whatever communica-
tions may be on those documents.
Were it not for the reference to Boyd, Schmerber would have allowed the
generalization that the privilege only applies when testimony, implied or ex-
plicit, is being compelled. Boyd, as reborn in Schmerber, qualified this gener-
Id. at 765.
69. Id. at 763 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) It is signif-
icant that Miranda and Schmerber were decided the same term, for in both the Court
found that controlling the browbeating of suspects was a key purpose of the privilege.
70. The Court finally recognized this in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,
410 n.l 1 (1976): "In the case of documentary subpoena the only thing compelled is the
act of producing the document and the compelled act is the same as the one performed
when a chattel . . . is demanded."
71. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 763-64.
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alization by excepting documents-one type of real or physical evidence, and
one type of property. Documents could still be suppressed, regardless of their
author, apparently on the ground that they contain communications. Logi-
cally, other physical evidence containing communications, such as t-shirts, en-
scribed trophies, bumper stickers, photographs, phonograph records and old
newspapers, could also be suppressed. Without the property rights approach,
however, the reason for suppressing property which contained communications
(albeit not compelled communications) was yet to be stated.
That reason, of course, turned out to be privacy. Shortly after Schmerber,
the Court, in Warden v. Hayden, 2 found that privacy, not property rights,
underly the fourth amendment.7 3 The Court was also beginning to find that
privacy was the rationale for the fifth amendment as well.7 4 The most explicit
adoption of privacy as the rationale for suppressing documents came in Couch
v. United States. 5 In that case, the claimant's documents were subpoenaed
from his accountant while the accountant possessed them. Consequently, the
claimant was not compelled to produce anything, a factor fatal under the long-
standing rule of Perlman."8 But Justice Powell's introduction went further and
endorsed the privacy goal of the privilege, namely that the privilege "respects
a private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought and proscribes state
intrusion to extract self-condemnation." '7 In Couch, the claimant had forfeited
his "reasonable expectations of privacy"7 8 in the documents when he handed
72. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
73. Id. at 304. Justice Brennan acknowledged the possibility of special treat-
ment for some property:
The items of clothing involved in this case are not "testimonial" or "commu-
nicative" in nature, and their introduction therefore did not compel respon-
dent to become a witness against himself in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment. . . .This case thus does not require that we consider whether there are
items of evidential value whose very nature precludes them from being the
object of a reasonable search and seizure.
Id. at 302-03 (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 757).
74. Support for the privacy policy as a key to the privilege was gaining even
before Schmerber. See United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir.
1956); Ratner, Consequences of Exercising the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
24 U. Cm. L. REv. 472, 488-89 (1957). After Schmerber, the support increased. See
Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966); Griswold, The Right
to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 216 (1960).
Justice Murphy's opinion in United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699-700
(1944) also emphasized privacy more than property rights:
Such records and papers are not the private records of the individual mem-
bers or officers of the organization. Usually, if not always, they are open to
inspection by the members and this right may be enforced on appropriate
occasions by available legal procedures.. . . They therefore embody no ele-
ment of personal privacy and carry with them no claim of personal privilege.
Id. cited in Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 92 (1974).
75. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
76. Id. at 332-333 (citing Perlman v. United States 247 U.S. 7, 15 (1918)).
77. Id. at 327.
78. Id. at 335. The parallel between Powell's emphasis on legitimate expecta-
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them to his accountant, knowing that mandatory disclosure of much of the
information in the documents was required by the tax laws. Incredibly, Justice
Powell cited Boyd in support of this "expectation of privacy" standard even
though the invoice in question there had been disclosed to others, was au-
thored by others, was required by statute, and contained a subject matter
wholly business in nature.
9
The triumph of the privacy rationale as the basis for surpressing docu-
ments was reinforced the next year in Bellis v. United States,80 in which a
member of a partnership attempted to suppress all partnership documents. As
if to dispute that property rights had ever governed the fifth amendment ap-
proach to documents, Justice Marshall claimed that privacy concerns had gov-
erned the earlier document cases as well. For example, he explained the Hale
v. Henkels8" rule that an organization could not suppress documents on the
ground that an organization could not maintain a legitimate expectation of
privacy in its documents."2
Under the privacy rationale as elaborated by Marshall, the claimant's
ability to restrict access to documents became a key factor. The corporate
documents in Wilson did not contain the requisite element of privacy or confi-
dentiality because "by virtue of [corporations'] character and the rules of law
applicable to them, the books and papers are held subject to examination by
the [state]."83 Applying this approach to the partnership documents at issue in
tions of privacy in fifth amendment law and a similar emphasis in fourth amendment
law was obvious. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967) (warrant
required to intrude on legitimate expectation of privacy).
79. Couch, 409 U.S at 335. The belief that Boyd turned on the content of the
invoice, rather than its ownership, has even been shared by commentators aware of
Bradley's property orientation. See, e.g., Note, supra note 21, at 946. The Court in
Boyd, never discussed the contents of the invoice, however; the invoice was suppressed
merely because it was the property of the partnership. 116 U.S. at 619-38. The tor-
tured transformation of Boyd from a case protecting property rights to one protecting
privacy may account for its durability as a fifth amendment landmark.
80. 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
81. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
82. As noted in Bellis:
Control of such records is generally strictly regulated by statute or by the
rules and regulations of the organization, and access to the records is gener-
ally guaranteed to others in the organization. In such circumstances the cus-
todian of the organization's records lacks the control over their content and
location and the right to keep them from the view of others which would be
characteristic of a claim of privacy and confidentiality.
417 U.S. at 92.
Justice Marshall's reading of Boyd completely ignored its property rights orienta-
tion. "Protection of individual privacy was the major theme running through the
Court's decision in Boyd, . . . and it was on this basis that the Court in Wilson distin-
guished the corporate records involved in that case from the private papers at issue in
Boyd." 417 U.S. at 91-92 (citations omitted).
83. 417 U.S. at 92 (quoting Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382
(1911)).
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Bellis focused attention on the accessibility of partnership documents under
state law. Pennsylvania law treated partnership documents much like corpo-
rate documents in that they remained accessible to every partner, and no part-
ner could use the documents without the consent of the other partners.84 Ap-
parently, these factors helped Marshall conclude that no reasonable
expectation of privacy concerning the partnership documents remained. 5
The privacy and property right rationales were not unrelated. Although
Justice Marshall, like Justice Powell, ignored Boyd's property rights approach,
ownership became relevant under Marshall's privacy test because it might al-
low a person to keep his documents confidential and use them without an-
other's consent. Moreover, the privacy and property rights rationales reflected
the notion that a person's personality is somehow embodied in his prop-
erty-or at least in his documents.86 A person's documents were supposedly an
extension of his personality. Hence, the argument went, using them against
him resembles compelling him to testify against himself. The embodiment no-
tion is perhaps easiest to grasp if one assumes-as the privacy proponents ap-
pear to do 87-- that the documents at issue resemble Anne Frank's diary, a
journal authored by the claimant which deals with a noncommercial subject
matter and expresses the claimant's own views and personality. The notion is
harder to grasp when applied to the car repair bills and medical insurance
receipts of an individual or the price lists of a sole proprietorship.
C. The Privacy Rationale-Its Misuse in a Noble Cause
While the privacy rationale echoed popular values of individualism-who
wants to compel Anne Frank to submit her diary?-it presented serious
84. Id. at 96-98. The partners could use the documents for partnership purposes
without permission. See id. at 98.
85. See id. at 101.
86. This "personality" theory of property reached back at least to Hegel. See G.
HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 44-53 (T. Knox ed. 1952); see also J. LOCKE,
Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 305-06 (P. Laslett ed. 1960); Corwin, The Supreme
Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause (pt. 2), 29 MICH. L. REv. 191,
205-06 (1930). But see H. REYBURN, THE ETHICAL THEORY OF HEGEL 129-31 (1970)
(criticizes the "personality theory").
The notion that a person's documents or other property are an extension of his
personality remains a viable principle in in the German Federal Republic. There, it is
associated with a constitutional principle protecting the free development of one's per-
sonality. Decision of 21 Feb. 1964, 19 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs fur
Strafrecht 325 (commonly known as the "Diary Case"). Whether a person's documents
or property may be used as evidence against him turns on a calculus weighing the
importance of the crime against his privacy interest in the particular documents or
property. Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in Germany, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1032, 1042-
43 (1983).
87. References to the need to protect diaries appear, for example in Couch v.
United States, 409 U.S. 322, 350 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) and in Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 n.7 (1976). Indeed, the fear of allowing a government
to subpoena a diary has supplied much of the persuasive power of the privacy rationale.
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problems. It called for an application of the fifth amendment privilege to docu-
ments which contradicted the application of the privilege to testimony. In
practice, its tests for suppressing documents proved even less susceptible to
sensible administration than had the earlier test. As a result, a person and a
sole proprietorship continued to be able to suppress almost all their documents.
1. The Premise of the Privacy Policy
As set forth in Couch and Bellis, the privacy rationale allowed a person to
resist a subpoena for incriminating documents on the ground that the claimant
maintained a reasonable expectation as to their privacy. Although "privacy" is
a catch phrase signifying different interests in different contexts, 88 privacy in
this context seemed to refer to at least two discrete interests. One is a person's
interest in being allowed to keep his thoughts and feelings-his daydreams, for
example-secret. This privacy interest is most compelling when the thoughts
have not been disclosed to any other person. An apparent goal of the privacy
rationale, therefore, was to allow a person to write his thoughts and feelings
without fear of the writing returning to haunt him. In Powell's words, the
writings, like the person's private thoughts, would lie within "a private inner
sanctum" protected from the government. The more the ability to write down
thoughts and feelings is seen as an aid to full personal growth, the stronger the
argument for some constitutional protection.
A second interest to which "privacy" seemed to refer is a person's interest
in reducing distribution of information about intimate matters, even though
the information is already known to a few others. Information about a person's
sexual activities would be an example. This interest increases as the informa-
tion sought concerns increasingly intimate matters. Consequently, the privacy
rationale would also allow suppression of documents such as love letters which,
while not authored by the claimant, pertained to an intimate subject matter
and had been circulated to only a few. Taken together, these two interests,
which the values of liberalism seem to support, may require allowing a person
to suppress documents which contain his own writings about his thoughts or
which pertain to intimate subjects, provided the documents have been kept
confidential or at least tightly restricted in circulation. 89
The privilege against self-incrimination, however, is not the appropriate
vehicle for these goals.90 Consider the application of the privilege to testimony.
There the application of the privilege turns solely on whether the testimony is
incriminating. If the information sought is incriminating, the privilege affords
88. See generally Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme
Court, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 173 (canvassing the various meanings of "privacy").
89. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 349-50 (1973) (Marshall, J.
dissenting).
90. The assumption that the privilege protects privacy and therefore ought to
allow suppression of documents has been criticized. See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 61,
at 686; see also In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 82-87 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.).
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complete protection; if not, it offers no protection. 9 Thus, the privilege allows
inquiry into a person's thoughts and daydreams as long as describing those
thoughts and daydreams does not tend to incriminate. It does not allow in-
quiry into past events the claimant has witnessed, however public, if describing
those events would incriminate. It allows inquiry into a person's past sexual
activities if describing them does not incriminate; it forbids inquiry into a pub-
lic official's past public acts if describing those acts would incriminate. It is
irrelevant whether the claimant has maintained a reasonable expectation of
privacy as to the information sought.
Nor does the language of the privilege, which only refers to self-incrimi-
natory testimony, suggest a goal of protecting privacy. One side effect of not
compelling self-incriminating testimony has often been suppression of some
private information; but this does not mean protecting privacy is a goal.92 In
Kastigar v. United States,9" the Court implicitly rejected the idea that the
privilege protects against disclosure of private information. In that case, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of immunity statutes which remove the in-
voker's privilege once he was provided use immunity from prosecution, i.e.,
once he was assured his incriminatory response would not be used to prosecute
him. The Court felt that, by providing the invoker use immunity, the govern-
ment had removed all policy reasons for invoking the privilege. 4 This conclu-
sion could not have been reached if protection of privacy was an additional
goal, for the invoker's privacy interests are frustrated when he is compelled to
provide private information, immunity order or no.9 5
When the government is seeking documents, the fourth amendment,
which expressly refers to "papers," seems better suited to evaluating and pro-
tecting privacy interests than the fifth.96 Under the fourth amendment, the
91. Ulman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430-31 (1956) (privilege is available
only when the answer would tend to incriminate); see also United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 353 (1974) (testimony about intimate matters can be compelled unless it
incriminates); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281-82 (1919) (same); Brown v.
Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 598 (1896) (same).
92. It is unclear whether those who added the privilege to the fifth amendment
sought more than this ancillary protection of privacy. In any event, the consensus of
authority seems to be that "the history of the privilege does not settle the policy of the
privilege." 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2251, at 295.
93. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
94. Id. at 448-59.
95. Indeed, if the privilege sought to allow suppression of private information,
no immunity statute, even one granting transactional immunity, would be coextensive
with the scope of the privilege. Thus, Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956),
and Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), would have been wrongly decided.
96. After Schmerber, protection under the privilege turned on the "testimonial"
character of the evidence, an approach that does not necessarily focus on privacy inter-
ests. See United States v. Bennet, 409 F.2d 888, 896 (2d Cir. 1969) (Friendly, J.)
("[A]n approach geared to the objective of the Fourth Amendment to secure privacy
would seem more promising than one based on the testimonial character of what is
seized.").
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courts directly evaluate a person's privacy interests in suppressing documents
and must balance those interests against the harm to the government's interest
in law enforcement caused by suppression.9 7 This balancing test has not re-
sulted in anything like the absolute protection for certain documents which
comes from applying the privilege. After the demise of the "mere evidence"
rule, documents for which an expectation of privacy exists can be seized if
probable cause is established and a warrant is obtained.98 Yet seizing a per-
son's documents offends privacy interests just as much as does compelling the
person to submit the documents. The intrusion involved in the government's
seizure of documents adds an indignity and assault on privacy not present
where submission is compelled by a subpoena. The subpoena procedure at
least leaves the assembly of the documents in the control of the person
himself.9
On the other hand, a broadly drafted subpoena will often sweep up more
documents than will a narrowly drawn search warrant. Requiring probable
cause and a description of the particular documents desired will reduce the
number of documents seized. In contrast, case law allows subpoenas to be
broad in scope and to request a large number of documents. 10 0 For example,
grand jury subpoenas may force persons to unearth many documents of which
the government investigators were unaware and for which the investigators
could not have established the probable cause a warrant requires.
97. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58 (1967) (balancing interests in
privacy and law enforcement). The Court in the past two decades has indicated that
increasingly severe standards of probable cause are necessary to justify increasingly
intrusive searches. See generally Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965). Commenta-
tors have explored how the fourth amendment ought to apply to documents in the con-
text of protecting privacy. See, e.g., Bradley, Constitutional Protection for Private Pa-
pers, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 461, 479-84 (1981) (standard more demanding than
probable cause should govern seizure of personally authored and confidentially main-
tained documents).
98. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 476-77 (1976) (search for business
records in suspect's office upheld); Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42
U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 69-70 (1974); see also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 441-
43 (1976) (person's checks and accounts are not immune from seizure); cf. Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (claimaint's conversations can be recorded pursu-
ant to a warrant, even though made with a reasonable expectation of privacy).
99. The passage of the Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94
Stat. 1879 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000Daa (1982)), demonstrated a congres-
sional preference for obtaining documents by subpoenas, a method less intrusive than
search and seizure. The law was a reaction to Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547
(1978) (upheld seizure of photographs from student newspaper), and sought to limit,
but not prevent, searches and seizures of documents from newspapers and other en-
gaged in first amendment activities. See also Guidelines on Methods of Obtaining Doc-
umentary Materials Held by Third Parties, 28 C.F.R. § 59 (1984).
100. Subpoenas are subject only to requirements of relevance and minimal speci-
ficity, standards less rigorous than the warrant requirements of probable cause and
particularity. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946).
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Despite the large number of documents that a subpoena may request, the
harm to privacy interests from being compelled to submit the documents can
be mitigated. The claimant's primary means of protection is to restrict the
circulation of sensitive documents. When the documents are requested by a
federal grand jury, the requirements of grand jury secrecy will impose some
limits on the document's circulation.101 If and when the investigation turns
into a criminal case, the subpoenaed person can probably reduce the circula-
tion of the documents by obtaining a protective order.10 2 A protective order
can also restrict the circulation of documents submitted in a civil case.1
03
These orders can be designed to keep the documents from everyone except the
opposing party's counsel, who may be ordered not to reveal their contents. The
courts are accustomed to limiting discovery, through protective orders and
other methods, in order to protect privacy interests.1 0 4 The various methods
devised for maintaining the privacy of a litigant's trade secrets offer
101. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e); Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops N.W., 441 U.S.
211, 222 (1979) (transcripts of grand jury testimony should be disclosed only to liti-
gants in related cases under similar circumstances); United States v. Proctor & Gam-
ble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958) (same).
102. Rule 16(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allows even a
non-party to obtain a protective order for cause. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(1).
103. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). The privacy interests that support suppressing a per-
son's documents when they are subpoenaed by the government apply with less force
when the documents are sought by a private plaintiff. The danger of the documents
being used to prosecute the claimant decreases, especially when a protective order lim-
its access to the documents. Nevertheless, the government may learn of the documents
if they are used at trial or subpoenaed from the adverse party.
More importantly, the interest which the proponents of a privacy approach sought
to protect seems to center on a person's interest in keeping personal writings from the
eyes of the government. Hence, the privilege operates as a limit on government power.
Disclosing documents to private plaintiffs, while just as embarassing as disclosing them
to the government, enhances the government's power much less.
104. "Privacy interests" refer here only to the two interests described supra at
notes 90-91 and accompanying text. The current law gives absolute protection to much
private information under other privileges. See, e.g., United States v. Goldfarb, 328
F.2d 280, 281 (6th Cir.) (attorney-client), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 976 (1964); Note,
The Physician-Patient Privilege, 58 W. VA. L. REv. 76 (1955); United States v. Lus-
tig, 555 F.2d 737, 747 (9th Cir. 1977) (marital communications).
The law also protects privacy interests by recognizing a tort action when private
information is disclosed to a person's detriment. See Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App.
285, 297 P. 91 (1931) (action for publicizing facts about the plaintiff's personal life)
(superceded by statute; see Roberts v. Gulf Oil Corp. 147 Cal. App. 3d 770, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 383 (1983)); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284
(1961) (bank's disclosure of plaintiff's finances supports action for breach of confiden-
tial relation). See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS ch. 20
(4th ed. 1971).
Related interests are protected by familiar constitutional limits on the govern-
ment's power to regulate intimate, see, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (use of contraceptives), or private activities, see, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557 (1969) (home display of pornography).
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examples.' 0 5
Assuming, however, that Anne Frank should remain able to resist a sub-
poena for her diary, she should not need to rely on the privilege. The right to a
"private enclave where one can lead a private life" need not be abandoned
merely because the fifth amendment is an inappropriate vehicle for securing it.
One alternative is to recognize a right under the first amendment to suppress a
person's writings which have been kept confidential and which deal with her
private thoughts and feelings or intimate personal matters.
There are many advantages in not basing such a right in the fifth amend-
ment. Traditional fifth amendment rules derived to deal with testimony, but
often inappropriate for documents, may be jettisoned. One such rule provides
that the claimant need not turn over allegedly privileged information in cam-
era so the court can determine whether the privilege applies.'0 8 Another fifth
amendment rule gives the claimant the benefit of any doubt about whether the
information is privileged. 107 As discussed below, when applied to documents,
the combined effect of these rules is to prevent courts from determining
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy has been maintained as to the
documents in question. Under a new privilege the courts need not be ham-
pered by these rules and thus will be better able to apply whatever test is
developed to protect privacy interests. For example, the claimant can be re-
quired not only to submit the documents in camera, but to show he has au-
thored them and has sufficiently restricted their circulation. He can also be
required to show the extent to which their subject matter is personal rather
than business. In short, he can be required to meet whatever standards for a
first amendment privilege are developed by the courts.
Such a first amendment "privilege" draws support from several cases sug-
gesting a similar privilege for certain testimony.'0 8 In Gibson v. Florida Legis-
lative Investigation Committee, " the Court recognized a first amendment
privilege in upholding a witness's refusal to answer questions about his politi-
105. See 4 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 26,750, at 26-540; see,
e.g., Xerox Corp. v. IBM Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (production
ordered to "counsel only"); Hunter v. Interntational Sys. & Control Corp., 51 F.R.D.
251, 262 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (production conditioned on preventing disclosure to others).
106. See note 109 infra.
107. Cf Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 488 (1951) (disclosure of al-
legedly privileged information cannot be compelled unless it is perfectly clear that the
information is not privileged).
108. See Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 8 (1970); Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958); Watkins v. New York, 354 U.S. 178, 200
(1957); Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661 F.2d 1243, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1981), vacated
sub. nom. Moore v. Black Panther Party, 458 U.S. 1118 (1982); Note, Discovery, 27
VILL. L. REV. 198, 208 (1982). But see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972)
(refusing to recognize a first amendment privilege for newsmen); Law Students Civil
Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 161 (1970) (refusing to recog-
nize a first amendment privilege protecting political actions).
109. 372 U.S. 539, 543-46 (1963).
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cal beliefs and associations. Before answers to such questions could be com-
pelled, the state must "convincingly show a substantial relation between the
information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling State inter-
est."' 10 A similar showing could be required before invading a person's private
enclave by compelling submission of qualifying personal documents.
Development of the first amendment privilege suggested in Gibson should
prevent wide-ranging legislative inquiries into the beliefs and associations of
political dissidents. Before Gibson, dissidents lacked any method for blocking
such inquiries other than the privilege against self-incrimination. The privilege
was an awkward tool for this purpose because dissidents could only invoke it to
block those inquiries to which their replies would incriminate. Moreover, by
invoking the privilege they appeared, at least in the public's eye, to be admit-
ting wrongdoing.
In contrast, one who refuses to respond because the government inquiry
intrudes upon constitutionally protected beliefs and associations throws atten-
tion on whether the government is entitled to ask the question, not on the
incriminatory nature of his response. The claimant's refusal to answer is seen
to spring from the impropriety of the inquiry, not from the illegality of his
conduct."'
In summary, the privacy policy as an independent goal of the privilege
collided with the privilege's approach to testimony and, to some extent, with
the fourth amendment's approach to privacy. Moreover, privacy interests
could be protected to some extent by protective orders and by other methods
for restricting the circulation of documents. Finally, privacy interests over-
lapped with first and ninth amendment values and could be protected with
more precision and candor, and less administrative difficulty, by evolving a
privilege based on those amendments. The awkward attempt to protect docu-
ments under the self-incrimination privilege may have delayed that evolution.
2. The Practical Effect of the Privacy Rationale
In practice, the privacy approach allowed a great many more documents
to be suppressed than the image of Anne Frank's diary or the wish to protect
legitimate expectations of privacy would warrant. Typically, a person or pro-
prietorship subpoenaed to produce its documents would reply with a motion to
quash the entire subpoena based on the privilege. As long as the claimant was
not an organization ineligible to invoke the privilege, the motion to quash gen-
erally succeeded and all documents in the claimant's possession were sup-
pressed." 2 The claimant did not need to show anything about the documents'
110. Id. at 546.
111. Others have argued that first amendment values will be better protected by
developing the Gibson first amendment privilege than by continuing to rely on the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination. See Friendly, supra note 61, at 696.
112. Cf. In re Lukich, 335 F. Supp. 557, 558 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (documents not
suppressed; documents owned by single shareholder corporation).
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subject matter, authorship, or previous distribution." 3 It was not even clear
that the claimant needed to claim that his documents would incriminate
him.114 Advertising flyers prepared by the claimant's employees and seen by
millions, price lists, and automobile repair bills were as likely to be suppressed
as the claimant's secret diaries of her thoughts and feelings. While the claim-
ant's reasonable expectations of privacy were said to justify the general rule
allowing her to suppress documents in her possession, courts did not insist
upon a document by document inquiry into whether the claimant had pre-
served a reasonable expectation of privacy as to each document.,""
Some of those committed to using the privilege to protect privacy, most
notably Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Powell, had implied that the privilege
should only extend to documents in which the invoker maintained a "legiti-
mate expectation of privacy."" 6 Where a claimant had disclosed his records to
others or where others acquired access to the records, a reasonable expectation
113. Cf. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 (1974) (expectation of
privacy test applied to voice identification).
114. Boyd and the property rights approach in general did not emphasize
whether the documents were incriminatory, nor did the logic of the privacy approach.
The interest in maintaining the privacy of one's documents would be sacrificed when
the documents were required to be produced, regardless of their incriminatory
character.
The lower courts differed, with some flatly requiring the claimant to show that tile
documents were incriminatory, and others relying on the general rule that a person
may not be compelled to produce any of his documents, save for those falling within
the required records exception. Compare United States v. Ponder, 475 F.2d 37, 39 (5th
Cir. 1973) (claimant must show that each document is incriminatory) and In re Tur-
ner, 309 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1962) (same) with Stuart v. United States, 416 F.2d 459,
462 n.3 (5th Cir. 1969) (documents suppressed without inquiring into whether they
were incriminatory); and United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 467 (9th Cir. 1963)
(same).
In some cases, the Supreme Court has assumed, without explanation, that the
claimant must at least allege that the documents are incriminatory. Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 417 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring); Bellis v. United States,
417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 (1974); United
States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944). However, the Court has never indicated the
method for determining whether a document is incriminatory.
115. See, e.g., Hill v. Philpott, 445 F.2d 144, 148 (7th Cir.) (suppression is al-
lowed if the evidence sought "relates to some communicative act or writing"), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 1972 TRADE CASES
(CCH) 73,857 at 91,594 (W.D. Ky. 1972) (all non-corporate documents suppressed
without inquiry into whether expectation of privacy maintained as to each).
116. Justice Marshall has advocated a factor test that weighs the nature of the
documents (compare a diary with an advertisement), and the steps that the claimant
has taken to secure privacy (compare use of a safety deposit box with general internal
distribution). Couch, 409 U.S. at 351 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Similarly, Justice
Brennan has emphasized whether the documents are "wholly business rather than per-
sonal in nature," the prior access to the documents allowed others, and the claimant's
attempts to maintain secrecy. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 414, 425 (Brennan, J., concurring);
see also Couch, 409 U.S. at 335-36 (Powell, J.) (test is whether expectation of privacy
is reasonable).
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of privacy no longer existed. The subject matter of the documents also affected
their protected status-the more the subject matter is wholly business rather
than personal, the less the claimant's privacy interests. 17 In theory, therefore,
the privacy policy would allow suppression of relatively few documents.
Unfortunately, any test based on the document's subject matter, extent of
circulation, availability to third parties, or incriminatory character presented
major administrative problems. Such a test called for document by document
judgments which the trial court could not render sensibly. One reason, already
noted, was that other fifth amendment cases suggest the claimant cannot con-
stitutionally be required to show her documents to the court." 8 Yet the test
suggested by the privacy proponents would require the trial judge to evaluate
the subject matter and circulation of the allegedly privileged documents with-
out seeing them. The test would therefore pressure the trial judge toward ac-
cepting the claimant's representations about the documents' subject matter
and circulation uncritically.
Even if the documents were available to the trial judge, the privacy test
would impose a prohibitive burden. A large sole proprietorship may submit a
thousand documents in response to a subpoena in an antitrust case. To tell if
each one is wholly business rather than personal in nature, especially without
guidance from opposing counsel, would have required the court to learn a
great deal about the invoker's personal life, background, and business. How
was the court to know, for example, whether the name placed on the claim-
ant's desk calendar for 2:00 p.m. on March 15 was that of an intimate per-
sonal friend or of a business competitor with whom the claimant was fixing
prices?
Determining whether each document had been seen only by the claimant
117. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 426-27 (Brennan, J., concurring). Nevertheless, even
these Justices continued to protect all the business records of a sole proprietor on the
ground that such records are an extension of "an aspect of a person's activities, though
concededly not the more intimate aspects of one's life." Id.; see Bellis v. United States,
417 U.S. 85, 87 (1974) (Marshall, J.).
118. The rule that a witness claiming the privilege need not reveal his response
to the court, even in camera, suggests by analogy that the'claimant opposing the docu-
ment subpoena need not submit documents. United States v. Weisman, 111 F.2d 260,
262 (2d Cir. 1940) (L. Hand, J.) (witness who invokes privilege need not respond); see
also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1964); Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S.
190, 198 n.18 (1955); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 487-89 (1951). See
generally United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1953); Weston, Confrontation
and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 567, 581 n.36 (1978) (in camera proceedings are feasible for assessing claims
of most privileges, but not for determining claims of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation). But see Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134, 144 (1928) (documents must
be revealed so the court may determine whether they are privileged).
Some courts have suggested an intermediate position that would require the party
invoking the privilege to describe the documents but not submit them. United States v.
Jones, 538 F.2d 225, 226 (8th Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977); United
States v. Johnson, 465 F.2d 793, 796 (5th Cir. 1972).
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would have been equally difficult. Often the face of a document does not indi-
cate its past circulation. Unless the claimant's word about the document's cir-
culation was accepted uncritically, the court would have needed to subpoena
others who might have seen the documents. Determining the right of access to
a document and determining the document's incriminatory character when it
was subpoenaed would have also presented difficulties."'
While the "legitimate expectation of privacy" test may be appropriate for
deciding whether a warrant is needed to seize specified items or communica-
tions under the fourth amendment; it could not be sensibly applied to decide
fifth amendment claims when a broad subpoena asks for many documents
which are only described by general categories. The failure of lower courts to
take the test seriously was inevitable.
D. Other Policies Behind the Privilege and the Protection of Documents
Because the assumption that the privilege protects some documents in
themselves has been so durable, a thorough search for support for this assump-
tion is unwarranted. Without the privacy policy, the question becomes whether
any generally recognized policy behind the privilege calls for protecting docu-
ments in themselves.1 20 The other policies expressed in Murphy fall into two
categories-the foxhunter policy and the old woman's policy. The foxhunter
policies reflect, in turn, two general goals-an attempt to influence the meth-
ods by which law enforcement officers investigate and prosecute crimes, and a
determination to maintain the proper balance of burdens and advantage be-
tween the government and the criminal suspect. The first goal is furthered by
using the privilege to discourage browbeating and torture, and to encourage
the search for evidence other than confessions. The second goal reflects the
historic dissatisfaction with inquisitorial systems where the suspect was forced
to assist in his own undoing. The goal is to ensure an adversary system in
which a state wishing to subject a suspect to fines or imprisonment is not enti-
tled to help from the suspect and must shoulder the entire burden of proving
guilt itself. This goal reflects beliefs about the proper distance and allocation
of power between the state and the individual which are central to the views of
119. A document will be incriminatory as long as it might provide a clue leading
to evidence of criminal conduct. A document which appears innocuous on its face may
be incriminatory when considered in combination with other circumstances. Hoffman v.
United States, 341 U.S 479, 486 (1951); Coffey v. United States, 198 F.2d 438, 440
(3d Cir. 1952); Falknor, Self-incrimination Privilege: Links in the Chain, 5 VAND. L.
REV. 479, 483 (1952). Determination of whether a document is incriminatory requires
substantial background knowledge about the activities of the claimant, the crimes that
he may have committed, and investigatory paths that the government might pursue. A
court is hardly in a position to obtain this knowledge when the documents are subpoe-
naed early in a government investigation or civil case.
120. This question must be separated from the question of whether any policies
behind the privilege call for protecting the implied admissions that may accompany
document submissions. See text accompanying notes 162-66 infra.
[Vol. 49468
1984] DOCUMENTS PRIVILEGE 469
Hobbes and Locke and to individualism generally. 2'
Allowing a person to suppress documents does not discourage browbeat-
ing and torture. When a suspect is in police custody, the temptation to use
coercive measures to obtain a confession is pronounced; the value of the privi-
lege in discouraging browbeating or torture in that context is apparent. The
temptation to browbeat a witness at a deposition or a trial in order to obtain a
confession calls for some prophylactic measure like the privilege in that con-
text as well. But subpoenaing a person to appear before a court or a grand
jury and turn over his documents does not create an occasion for such abuses.
When a person's instinct for self-preservation leads him to evade questions
asking for a verbal statement, the police responses invited at the station-house
are anger, trickery, and coercion. When a person fails to submit documents,
the only government response invited is a further subpoena."'
Nor must documents be suppressed in order to encourage the search for
evidence other than confessions. Any incriminatory statements arising from
the documents were uttered before the litigation or investigation began. As
long as the statements were not written under any compulsion, the fear of
compulsion that justifies the natural distrust of confessions does not apply to
them. Excluding them automatically underestimates the fact finder's capacity
to determine their reliability. Excluding them also opposes long-standing evi-
dence principles which recognize the reliability of past writings of a party and
allow such writings to be admitted against the party, despite the lack of cross-
examination at the time the statements were written.
23
Denying protection to documents would not threaten the goal of main-
taining the proper balance of advantage between the state and the individual
as that goal has been previously understood. 24 Granted, compelling the sub-
mission of documents will increase the extent to which the suspect may be
forced to assist in gathering evidence against himself. For example, in anti-
121. See T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 108 (H. Schneider ed. 1958); Locke, Second
Treatise. . . of Civil Government, in ENGLISH PHILOSOPHEgS FROM BACON TO MILL(E. Burtt ed. 1939).
122. The greater the danger that an unsatisfactory response will lead to coercion
being applied until the desired response is obtained, the more the need for the privilege.
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 17, ch. 13.
123. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1). When the statements on the documents are
not written by the person subpoenaed, there is plainly nothing "confessional" about
them, and this policy does not come into play.
124. In Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949), the Court identified some specific
requirements reflecting the commitment to an adversial system:
The requirement of specific charges, their proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
the protection of the accused from confessions extorted through whatever
form of police pressures, the right to a prompt hearing before a magistrate,
the right to assistance of counsel, to be supplied by government when circum-
stances make it necessary, the duty to advise an accused of his constitutional
rights-these are all characteristics of the accusatorial system and manifesta-
tions of its demands.
Id. at 54.
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trust cases submitting one's documents may require much effort, and the docu-
ments themselves may incriminate. Neither the involvement of the suspect in
submitting evidence nor the incriminating character of the evidence controls,
however. Suspects may provide important evidence against themselves when
they are forced to appear in line-ups and to provide fingerprints, blood tests,
and handwriting and voice samples. In compelling these measures, the Court
has clearly stated that this policy is not offended unless the government proves
its case or obtains its leads by forcing a person to testify against himself.1"'
Documents voluntarily prepared in the past do not contain testimony com-
pelled by the government, and therefore allowing the government to use this
evidence does not give it an inappropriate advantage.
Nor does the old woman policy call for protecting documents in them-
selves. This policy reflects the desire to avoid subjecting persons to the "cruel
trilemma" of telling the truth and admitting guilt, refusing to answer and be-
ing found in contempt, or lying and committing perjury. It reflects not only
humanitarian concerns for avoiding cruelty but due process concerns for main-
taining the appearance of humane legal processes. 2 ' Documents prepared vol-
untarily before a subpoena is issued are not prepared in the face of the cruel
trilemma. The contents of the documents-unlike the contents of a verbal
statement by a person called to testify-are not compelled in such a way that
the author in composing them is put to a choice of incrimination, perjury, or
contempt.
This summary indicates that none of the policies which are now said to
inform the privilege call for using the privilege to protect documents in them-
selves. Those who would immunize some documents, such as diaries, from sub-
poena must base this rule on some other privilege or policy.
E. Fisher v. United States-The End of Protecting Documents Under the
Privilege
The watershed opinion Fisher v. United States27 put to rest the
claim-whether based on property rights, privacy, or other grounds-that the
privilege protects documents in themselves. In Fisher, a taxpayer was invoking
the privilege in order to suppress tax-related summaries which his accountant
had prepared. The summaries were in the possession of the taxpayer's attorney
to whom the IRS summons was directed. Although transferring the summaries
125. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 265-67 (1967) (handwriting samples);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967) (appearing in line-ups); Schmer-
ber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966) (blood tests).
Admittedly, compelling a person to submit documents or any property does extort
some implied admissions, such as the admission that the person possessed the property
at the time of the subpoena. Whether extorting these implied admissions seriously of-
fends this policy is discussed at text accompanying notes 168-72 infra.
126. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2251.
127. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
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to another would normally have destroyed the taxpayer's fifth amendment
privilege,128 the Court found the attorney-client privilege still applied to the
summaries in the hands of the attorney."29 Thus, the Court reached the major
issue whether the summaries would have been privileged had they remained in
the hands of the taxpayer. 30
Justice White approached this issue by reviewing Boyd and the later in-
roads on the protection of documents. He pointed out the connection between
Boyd and the mere evidence rule, both of which rested on a single-minded
commitment to property rights.' 3' With the demise of the mere evidence rule,
the foundations of Boyd were "washed away."
White further refuted the claim that under Schmerber, documents pre-
pared voluntarily in the past constituted testimony or communications that,
unlike other physical evidence, were immune from subpoena. Rather, "the
privilege protects the person only against being incriminated by his compelled
testimonial communications."' 32 Justice White emphasized that documents
prepared voluntarily do not contain any compelled testimonial evidence. Jus-
tice Brennan's language in Schmerber suggesting the opposite-that volunta-
rily produced documents do contain testimonial evidence-was ignored.
Justice White addressed the privacy policy directly. He insisted that while
privacy might be guarded incidentally through protecting against compelled
self-incrimination, 133 protecting privacy was not a goal of the privilege:
We cannot cut the Fifth Amendment completely loose from the moorings of
its language and make it serve as a general protector of privacy-a word not
mentioned in its text and a concept directly addressed in the Fourth Amend-
ment. We adhere to the view that the Fifth Amendment protects against
"compelled self-incrimination, not the disclosure of private information."" 4
Fisher thus resolved that documents were to be treated like any other physical
128. Id. at 396.
129. Id. at 402-05.
130. Id. at 405.
131. "IT]he prohibition against forcing the production of private papers has long
been a rule searching for a rationale consistent with the proscriptions of the Fifth
Amendment against compelling a person to give 'testimony' that incriminates him." Id.
at 409 (citing Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921)).
132. "As far as this record demonstrates, the preparation of all of the papers
sought in this case was wholly voluntary, and they cannot be said to contain compelled
testimonial evidence, either of the taxpayers or of anyone else. The taxpayer cannot
avoid compliance with the subpoena merely by asserting that the item of evidence
which he is required to produce contains incriminating writing, whether his own or that
of someone else." 425 U.S. at 410 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761)
(footnote omitted).
133. "It is true that the court has often stated that one of the several purposes
served by the constitutional privilege against compelled testimonial self-incrimination is
that of protecting personal privacy. But the court has never suggested that every inva-
sion of privacy violates the privilege." 425 U.S. at 399 (citations omitted).
134. Id. at 400-01.
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property in the subpoenaed person's possession.133 The protection of the privi-
lege was finally limited to compelled testimony, although it would naturally
extend to compelled writings as well.1 3 6
135. As long as the subpoenaed documents were prepared voluntarily, "the only
thing compelled is the act of producing the documents, and the compelled act is the
same as the one performed when a chattel . . . is demanded." Id. at 410 n.1 1.
136. Despite the Court's clear statement that the privilege protects only the in-
criminatory implied admission coming from the submission of documents, the Fifth
Circuit, among others, continues to assume that the privilege applies to some docu-
ments in themselves. E.g., United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1042 (5th Cir.
1981); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Johanson), 632 F.2d 1033, 1042 (3d
Cir. 1980) (some documents still protected in themselves); ICC v. Gould, 629 F.2d
847, 858-59 (3d Cir. 1980) (same), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981). The confusion
may stem from the penultimate paragraph in Fisher :
Whether the Fifth Amendment would shield the taxpayer from producing his
own tax records in his possession is a question not involved here; for the pa-
pers demanded here are not his "private papers,". . . . We do hold that com-
pliance with a summons directing the taxpayer to produce the accountant's
documents involved in these cases would involve no incriminating testimony
within the protection of the Fifth Amendment.
425 U.S. at 414 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35 (1886)). The
Court meant to reserve this question only because compelling submission of records
that the taxpayer had written might compel implied admissions that would clearly au-
thenticate the records. Such implied admissions might be sufficiently testimonial and
incriminatory to be privileged. See infra text accompanying notes 131-34.
Justice White did not intend to renege on his previous discussion. He did not in-
tend to suggest that papers owned by the taxpayer would be protected regardless of
whether their submission entailed sufficiently incriminatory and testimonial implied ad-
missions. The Fifth Circuit has seized upon this paragraph, however, to claim that
documents are absolutely protected "from production by summons or subpoena as long
as they are in the hands of the owner." United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1042
(5th Cir. 1981). The Fifth Circuit's position that ownership and possession suffice was
rejected by the Supreme Court at least as early as 1948. See Shapiro v. United States,
335 U.S. 1 (1948) (compelling submission of required records owned and possessed by
claimant). At the most, Justice White was saying that ownership and possession might
be necessary conditions for suppression, not sufficient ones.
The paragraph in question has also been misconstrued to mean that papers of a
more private or personal nature than the accountant's summaries may be privileged in
themselves. Wilson & Matz, Obtaining Evidence for Federal Economic Crime Prose-
cutions: An Overview and Analysis of Investigative Methods, 14 AM. CRI,. L. Rnv.
651, 664 (1977). Fortunately, the citation to Boyd (where the document in question
was a business invoice as to which no reasonable expectation of privacy existed), clari-
fies that "private papers" here means personally owned papers, not papers for which a
reasonable expecation of privacy exists. Justice White did not mean to say that some
personally owned documents may yet be protected in themselves; only that compelling
submission of documents owned and authored by the claimant might compel implied
admissions sufficiently testimonial and incriminatory to warrant protection.
Admittedly, the Court in Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 465, 477 (1976), if
only by its repeated reference to the business nature of the records in issue, seemed to
reserve the question whether some documents might be of such a personal nature as to
be immune from seizure or subpoena. Moreover, in Fisher Justice White also distin-
guished a personal diary from the accountant's summaries. 425 U.S. at 401 n.7. Read
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III. PROTECTING THE IMPLIED ADMISSIONS FROM SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS
A. The Implied Admissions Theory: Fisher's Tangled Line
Although Fisher clarified that the privilege does not protect documents, it
did not dispose of the document submission issue. For, according to Justice
White, the privilege may yet protect a person from being compelled to submit
documents. The Court's rationale, derived primarily from Wigmore,"' 7 reasons
that forcing the persons subpoenaed to submit the requested documents (or
logically, any physical objects in his control) impliedly forces him to admit
that these documents exist, were in his possession or control, and were the
documents requested.138 Though never spoken, these implied admissions, un-
like the documents themselves, are testimonial in nature and are compelled
when the submission of documents is compelled. 3 9
When these implied admissions are sufficiently testimonial and incrimi-
nating, the privilege may be invoked and the documents suppreised. This is
true even when the documents themselves would serve as more important evi-
dence than the implied admissions. After Fisher, attention focuses not on the
ownership, private nature, or incriminating character of the documents them-
selves, but on whether the claimant will incriminate himself by admitting each
document exists, is in his possession or control, and is responsive to the sub-
poena. Conceivably, innocuous documents may now be suppressed and highly
incriminating documents compelled; the key is whether the judge considers the
admissions implied from submitting the documents sufficiently testimonial and
incriminating. That the government only wants the documents and is not in-
terested in using the implied admissions is immaterial.
This section examines the implied admissions theory as described and ap-
plied in Fisher. The more closely the theory is examined, and the more it is
compared with standards governing related matters, the more the theory
reveals itself to be attenuated in principle and unworkable in application.
B. The Uneven Application of the Implied Admissions Theory
The notion that submitting subpoenaed property constitutes testimony has
in context, however, White was merely suggesting that the privacy concerns presented
by a subpoena for a personal diary might warrant protecting the diary on some grounds
other than the fifth amendment, such as the first amendment. Id. at 401. Fortunately,
the Court has reaffirmed since Fisher that documents are not protected in themselves.
United States v. Doe, 104 S. Ct. 1237, 1241-42 (1984).
137. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, §§ 2263-64, at 379-80.
138. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410. Justice White suggested that the implied admis-
sions theory underlay Couch and Schmerber. 425 U.S. at 412 n.12.
139. Probably the most common method for introducing the implied admissions
into evidence would be through the testimony of the investigator who issued the sub-
poena for the documents and witnessed their submission by the person subpoenaed. The
government also could conceivably introduce any cover letter that the person subpoe-
naed might have included with the documents verifying that they are the documents
requested.
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not been applied evenhandedly. The Court has allowed other acts to be com-
pelled even though the acts equally constituted testimony. As Justice White
acknowledged, forcing an accused to provide a handwriting sample also com-
pels implied admissions: "When an accused is required to submit a handwrit-
ing exemplar he admits his ability to write and impliedly asserts that the ex-
emplar is his writing."' 40 These admissions are compelled nonetheless.
Perhaps the most incriminating implied admissions compelled by the
Court came in California v. Byers."" A plurality upheld a traffic statute com-
pelling a person in an accident involving property damage to stop at the scene
and give his name and address. This compelled conduct impliedly admitted
that the person had been involved in the accident, that he believed that prop-
erty damage had resulted, and that the name and address given were cor-
rect.' 41 More significantly, the compelled conduct forced the accused to focus
attention on himself as a suspect or witness, a result not shared by compelling
implied admissions that accompany submitting documents.
In upholding the statute in Byers, Chief Justice Burger compared the ad-
missions to the implied admission compelled when a person is put in a line-up
and forced to utter voice samples. In the latter case, the admission implied is
that the compelled statements are uttered in the person's "normal, undisguised
voice." Yet in United States v. Wade,' 4 3 when the line-up procedures were
attacked, the Court attached no significance to this implied admission on the
ground that it was not "testimonial" under the privilege."' Chief Justice Bur-
ger also noted that in earlier cases the Court had compelled the admissions
inherent in filing tax returns. 4 5
140. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411; see People v. Collier, 44 Cal. Rptr. 465, 469
(1965); Weintraub, Voice Identification, Writing Exemplars and the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 10 VAND. L. REv. 485, 496-97, 505 (1957).
141. 402 U.S. 424 (1971) (plurality opinion).
142. Id. at 456 (Harlan, J., concurring).
143. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
144. Id. at 222-23.
145. 402 U.S. at 428-29, 433-34; see also United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S.
259 (1927) (tax returns); cf. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (handwriting
samples, non-tax case). In Sullivan, the Court allowed the government to compel the
taxpayers to file a return and pay the tax due. The privilege could not be invoked by
refusing to file, but only by invoking the privilege on the return itself. Compelling the
filing forced the taxpayer to admit that the name and address on the return were true,
and that the filer received enough income to require reporting. Nevertheless, Justice
Holmes believed the claim of privilege was "an extreme if not extravagant application
of the Fifth Amendment." 274 U.S. at 263-64. Although the Court did not emphasize
the point, recognizing the implied admissions theory in Sullivan would have given tax-
payers who fail to file a safe defense.
Some lower courts have ignored the implied admissions that accompany compelled
acts on the ground that the admissions are merely incidental to a non-testimonial act.
See Welch v. District Court of Vt., 461 F. Supp. 592, 596 (D. Vt. 1978) (statements
uttered accompanying refusal to take a breathalyzer admitted as incident to refusal);
cf. United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229, 234 (2d Cir. 1929) (L. Hand,
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Even advocates of the implied admission theory can hardly contend that
no acts may be compelled that impliedly admit incriminating matters. For ex-
ample, acceptance of a subpoena or summons impliedly admits that the person
accepting is the person to whom the subpoena or summons is addressed. Simi-
larly, taking the stand when one's name is called at a civil trial impliedly
adopts the name called and surely situations exist in which these admissions of
one's identification incriminate.
The claim that incriminatory implied admissions should not be compelled
also conflicts with statutes requiring explicit disclosures which may incrimi-
nate. Examples are statutes requiring doctors to report deaths and their
causes, druggists to report sales of poisons, and persons in charge of factories
to report accidents and injuries.148 Any analysis of whether these statutes vio-
late the privilege must begin with the recognition that the statutes compel
admissions which may expressly or impliedly incriminate.
Implied admissions were also compelled in previous cases involving the
submission of documents. For instance, the required records rule of Shapiro v.
United States4 7 allows the government to compel a person to submit records
he was statutorily required to keep. Yet compelling submission of these docu-
ments also compels the usual implied admissions. Indeed, the admissions im-
plied from submitting required records include the admission that these docu-
ments are the ones the statute has required, admissions which may be
particularly significant and incriminating.
The Court also compels implied admissions when it requires a custodian
of an organization's records to submit them when subpoenaed, even though
doing so would incriminate her. Justice White acknowledged this in Fisher.
Moreover .... the custodian of corporate, union, or partnership books or
those of a bankrupt business was ordered to respond to a subpoena for the
business' books even though doing so involved a "representation that the doc-
uments produced are those demanded by the subpoena."...
In these cases compliance with the subpoena is required even though the
books have been kept by the person subpoenaed and his producing them would
itself be sufficient authentification to permit their introduction against him.148
The custodian's implied admissions are just as likely to be testimonial and
incriminating as the sole proprietor's.149 Now that the Court in Fisher has
J.) ("[T]estimony auxiliary to the production [of documents] is as unprivileged as are
the documents themselves.").
146. E.g., People v. Rosenheimer, 209 N.Y. 115, 120, 102 N.E. 530, 532 (1913).
147. 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
148. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 413 & n.14 (citations omitted; quoting Curcio v. United
States, 354 U.S. 118, 125 (1957)).
149. Sole owners of corporations have consistently been compelled to submit the
corporate documents, even though they are incriminating themselves by implied admis-
sions in doing so. See Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74, 79-80 (1913); United States
v. Shlom, 420 F.2d 263, 265-66 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1074 (1970);
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ruled that documents of a sole proprietor are in themselves as unprivileged as
documents of an organization, no reason exists for compelling the implied ad-
missions of a custodian, but not a sole proprietor.
C. The Requirement That Implied Admissions Be Sufficiently Testimonial
and Incriminating
Justice White was willing to compel implied admissions that were testi-
monial and incriminatory under certain circumstances. For instance, submis-
sion of the work papers of the accountant in Fisher could be compelled be-
cause the work paper's existence, possession by the claimant, and
responsiveness to the summons were a "foregone conclusion" that did not need
to be proven through the implied admissions. 150 Therefore, because the implied
admissions were so unimportant to the government's case, Justice White be-
lieved they were not "sufficiently testimonial."' 51
If the implied admissions in Fisher had been sufficiently testimonial, they
could be compelled on the alternative ground that they were not sufficiently
incriminating. 5" According to Justice White, the implied admissions would
incriminate sufficiently only if they would authenticate the documents.
White's approach in deciding whether the implied admissions would be
incriminatory was out-of-step with the approach generally used in deciding the
incriminatory potential of information. For example, previous cases, most no-
Fineberg v. United States, 393 F.2d 417, 420 (9th Cir. 1968); Hair Indus. Ltd. v.
United States, 340 F.2d 510, 511 (2d Cir. 1965); see also United States v. Richardson,
469 F.2d 349, 351-52 (10th Cir. 1972) (corporate officer who owned substantially all
the stock); cf. George Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392 U.S. 286, 288-89 (1968)(director/president/shareholder in closely held, family owned corporation).
150. The Court noted in Fisher: "The existence and location of the papers are
foregone conclusions and the taxpayer adds little or nothing to the sum total of the
government's information by conceding that he in fact has the papers." 425 U.S. at
411.
151. Id. at 411. In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan attacked White's sug-
gestion that implied admissions lose their testimonial character when they are unimpor-
tant as evidence. He stated that "I know of no Fifth Amendment principle which
makes the testimonial nature of evidence and, therefore, one's protection against in-
criminating himself, turn on the strength of the Government's case against him." 425
U.S. at 429 (Brennan, J., concurring). While Justice Brennan's point seems indisputa-
ble, Justice White's meaning may have been more far-reaching. He may have meant
that in deciding whether the implied admissions are sufficiently testimonial, a court
should weigh policies instead of categorizing the admissions as testimonial or non-testi-
monial. Here, White may have concluded that compelling the implied admissions
would not seriously offend the policies behind the privilege, and on that basis have
labeled the admissions insufficiently testimonial.
152. Id. at 412-13. The notion that testimony can be insufficiently incriminating
as a matter of degree to invoke the privilege conflicts with past decisions. See, e.g.,
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966) ("The privilege against self-incrimina-
tion protects the individual from being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner;
it does not distinguish degrees of incrimination.").
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tably Hoffman v. United States'53 and United States v. Coffey,'" established
that admissions innocuous on their face will be considered incriminatory as
long as they may provide either circumstantial evidence of criminal conduct or
investigatory clues leading to evidence of criminal conduct. 1 55 The party seek-
ing to overcome a claim of privilege bore a severe burden. In the Supreme
Court's words, the claim of privilege could not be overruled unless it is "'per-
fectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case
that the witness is mistaken, and the answer cannot possibly have such ten-
dency' to incriminate.' i5 6
Yet White appeared to put the burden of proof on the claimant and to
require that the admissions be incriminatory on their face. 57 Under previous
cases the claimant need only sketch a scenario of how his response could com-
bine with other circumstantial evidence to show criminal conduct, or how it
could lead investigators step-by-step to uncover evidence of criminal con-
duct.5 a8 Nevertheless, White felt sufficiently confident about the possible uses
of these implied admissions to rule out all scenarios through which they could
tend to incriminate except for the possibility that they would authenticate the
papers. 5 9 The conflict with Hoffman was not just a matter of language. White
153. 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
154. 198 F.2d 438 (3d Cir. 1952), approved in Emspak v. United States, 349
U.S. 190, 198 n.18 (1955).
155. 341 U.S. at 486-87; 198 F.2d at 440.
156. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. at 488 (quoting Temple v. Common-
wealth, 75 Va. 892, 898 (1881)). See generally Heidt, The Conjurer's Circle-The
Fifth Amendment Privilege in Civil Cases, 91 YALE L.J. 1082, 1090 (1982).
157. The Fisher Court stated that:
[S]urely it is not illegal to seek accounting help in connection with one's tax
returns or for the accountant to prepare workpapers and deliver them to the
taxpayer. At this juncture, we are quite unprepared to hold that either the
fact of existence of the papers or of their possession by the taxpayer poses any
realistic threat of incrimination to the taxpayer.
425 U.S. at 412.
158. See supra notes 113-14. Implied admissions may be incriminatory even
though they appear innocuous. The court must determine whether the implied admis-
sions considered in combination with other information might constitute circumstantial
evidence or clues leading to evidence of criminal conduct. E.g., In re Atterbury, 316
F.2d 106, 109-11 (6th Cir. 1963) (trial court erred in refusing to allow witnesses to
show circumstances that made demanded testimony self-incriminatory); In re Portell,
245 F.2d 183, 185 (7th Cir. 1957) (trial court erred in excluding newspaper clippings
showing how testimony would be self-incriminatory); Ballantyne v. United States, 237
F.2d 657, 664-65 (5th Cir. 1956) (prior statements of witnesses to IRS agents and
grand jury showed that answering grand jury question would incriminate witness); see
also Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951) (response can be shown to
be incriminating without introducing evidence).
159. See 425 U.S. at 412-13. Conspicuously absent from White's discussion is
any reference to Hoffman, perhaps suggesting that Hoffman's expansive view of in-
criminatory information is ripe for restriction. Another explanation for the failure to
cite Hoffman is suggested by Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968), and
Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968). In these cases, the claimants attacked
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recognized that the taxpayer in Fisher, by being compelled to submit the ac-
countant's summaries, was forced to admit impliedly that the documents exist,
were in his possession, and were responsive to the summons . 60 Under Hoff-
man, investigatory or evidentiary scenarios under which these admissions
would tend to incriminate were not as inconceivable as Justice White sug-
gested. Surely these admissions might have incriminated in ways other than by
authenticating the documents. For instance, the taxpayer's implied admission
that he possessed the summaries is some evidence that the summaries were
sent to him, and that he read them or was otherwise aware of their contents.
Thus, if the summaries contained the accountant's opinions about the legality
of possible tax strategies, the implied admission that the taxpayer possessed
them would help to establish the scienter element in a later prosecution for tax
fraud.
In other contexts, the implied admissions from submitting documents may
seriously incriminate even when they do not authenticate. For example, admit-
ting possession of stolen documents may provide some evidence that the claim-
ant stole the documents, not to mention damning evidence that the claimant
received the stolen documents. In price-fixing cases, an executive's awareness
of correspondence from competitors inviting him to participate in a price-
fixing consipiracy may constitute circumstantial evidence of his own participa-
tion. His awareness of correspondence from competitors revealing their future
pricing plans may provide circumstantial evidence of price fixing. By admit-
ting possession of certain documents, a sole proprietor will help the govern-
ment establish that the documents were kept in the regular course of business,
a requirement needed for the government to admit the documents under the
business record exception to the hearsay rule.'61
statutes that required registration and taxation of gamblers. The fifth amendment at-
tacks centered on compelled conduct that either incriminated in itself or implied testi-
mony that incriminated. The Court paid little, if any, attention to Hoffman and its
liberal standards for determining what is "incriminatory." Rather, the Court empha-
sized that a claimant must be confronted with hazards of incrimination that are "sub-
stantial and 'real" and not merely trifling or imaginary." Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 53;
Grosso, 390 U.S. at 67. The Fisher Court's failure to cite Hoffman accords with these
cases and suggests that implied admissions will not be deemed incriminating as readily
as testimony will be.
160. 425 U.S at 410. The taxpayer's accountant had produced the summaries;
thus, the taxpayer himself had not impliedly admitted anything. Nevertheless, because
the issue was whether the summaries would have been privileged had they remained in
the taxpayer's hands, the Court was forced to examine the implied admissions that
would have been compelled had the taxpayer produced the summaries.
161. The Court noted in Fisher:
The taxpayer would be no more competent to authenticate the accountant's
workpapers or reports by producing them than he would be to authenticate
them if testifying orally. The taxpayer did not prepare the papers and could
not vouch for their accuracy. The documents would not be admissible in evi-
dence against the taxpayer without authenticating testimony. Without more,
responding to the subpoena in the circumstances before us would not appear
to represent a substantial threat of self-incrimination.
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Justice White's treatment of the authenticity issue is no less baffling. Ac-
cording to White, whether a taxpayer's submission of documents will authenti-
cate them depends on whether he prepared the documents himself. The tax-
payer in Fisher did not prepare the accountant's summaries; therefore, his
submission of them did not authenticate them, a fact White believed to be
fatal to his fifth amendment claim. Only the accountant supposedly would be
able to authenticate the summaries.
Under normal evidence principles, however, the accountant's summaries
could be authenticated in any number of ways.16 2 Probably anyone who could
recognize the summaries as genuine, based on their contents, character, the
recognition of the accountant's signature, or other distinguishing features
could authenticate them.' 63 Indeed, the taxpayer's implied admission that he
possessed the summaries is some evidence that he received them. Together
with other evidence showing that the accountant had promised to prepare and
send the summaries to the taxpayer, the implied admission of possession may
indeed authenticate the summaries.'"
Another troubling suggestion in Justice White's opinion is that the tax-
payer would not be able to authenticate the accountant's summaries because
he would be unable to vouch for their "accuracy."'"" White stated that "pro-
duction would express nothing more than the taxpayer's belief that the papers
are those described in the subpoena . ,,."166 Showing authenticity, however,
involves a preliminary showing of the document's genuineness, not its accu-
racy. 6 7 Once authenticated, documents are often admitted into evidence for
purposes other than showing the accuracy of any assertions they might con-
tain; in these instances there is no need for a preliminary showing of the docu-
ment's accuracy.
In Fisher, the record does not show the possible purposes for which the
government might have introduced the summaries. Their "accuracy" may
have been unimportant. If the government wanted to show the accuracy of the
425 U.S. at 412 (footnote omitted).
162. FED. R. EvID. 901 allows authentication or identification by any evidence
"sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims." See 5 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 901(a)[02]
(1983); Levin, Authentication and Content of Writings, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 632, 635-
37 (1956).
163. 5 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 162, § 901(b)(2)[01], Rule 2
(familiarity with handwriting); id. §§ 901(b)(2)[01]-[04] (distinctive characteristics of
writing).
164. E.g., Greenbaum v. United States, 80 F.2d 113, 124-25 (9th Cir. 1935)
(company's mailing of letter shown by evidence of receipt of a letter through the mail
bearing company's name and sent from a town in which the company operated); cf.
Conner v. Zanuzoski, 36 Wash. 2d 458, 464-65, 218 P.2d 879, 882-83 (1950) (when
combined with some evidence that a letter was written and mailed, evidence that a
reply letter was received is sufficient to authenticate the original letter).
165. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 413.
166. Id. at 412.
167. See FED. R. EvID. 901.
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assertions in the summaries, it would not only need to authenticate the sum-
maries but also to bring them within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule.
The inability of the taxpayer to vouch for the summaries' "accuracy" does not
negate the possibility that by impliedly admitting possession of the summaries,
the taxpayer may have helped to authenticate them or may have otherwise
incriminated himself.
In short, the implied admissions from submitting the accountant's sum-
maries may have tended to incriminate the taxpayer under the Hoffman stan-
dards in several different ways. By asking only whether the implied admissions
were on their face evidence of criminal conduct or would alone authenticate
the summaries, the Court either underestimated their incriminatory potential
or was presaging a major restriction in Hoffman's expansive notion of an in-
criminatory statement.
This section has described the requirements that implied admissions from
submitting documents must be sufficiently testimonial, and sufficiently incrimi-
nating before the documents can be suppressed. The first requirement means
at least that the admissions must not be foregone conclusions in light of the
other evidence available to a prosecutor. Because a court must decide whether
this requirement is met at the time for submitting the documents, it appar-
ently must make a prediction about the other evidence which is likely to be
available. The requirement that implied admissions be sufficiently incriminat-
ing carries a new and uncertain meaning. Implied admissions that authenti-
cate the documents submitted appear to meet this test. But the Court's baf-
fling treatment of the authenticity issue gives little guidance to lower courts
that now must decide whether the implied admissions in their case will au-
thenticate. Indeed, neither Fisher nor United States v. Doe,168 the Court's only
elaboration on Fisher, provides significant guidance about when implied ad-
missions from submitting documents will satisfy the two requirements.169 As a
result, lower courts have tended to conclude that implied admissions will or
will not meet these requirements without discussion and without principled
analysis?170
168. 104 S. Ct. 1237 (1984) (Court refused to review whether lower court cor-
rectly decided factual questions of whether implied admissions would authenticate and
incriminate).
169. Standards for determining whether implied admissions are sufficiently in-
criminating are not likely to develop. The lack of standards combined with the unwill-
ingness of higher courts to review decisions about whether implied admissions incrimi-
nate sufficiently give trial courts complete discretion on this issue. But see id. at 1243
n.13 (documents will not be suppressed if the government shows that their existence,
possession, and authentication are "foregone conclusions").
170. Fisher has produced varying results in the lower courts. Some courts have
suppressed all documents authored by the subpoenaed person, including business
records, on the assumption that the implied admissions will incriminate the claimant by
authenticating the documents. This principle allows the claimant to prevail without
showing that the implied admissions from producing each document would incriminate.
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 626 F.2d 1051, 1058 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v.
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D. Administering Fisher's Tangled Line
The greatest concern about the implied admissions theory, at least as de-
scribed in Fisher, is the difficulty of administering it. When a person refuses to
submit documents by claiming the privilege, courts now need to make a deter-
mination for each unseen document, determining not only whether admitting
the existence, possession, and responsiveness of the document will incriminate
sufficiently,'1 ' but also whether the admissions are likely to be sufficiently im-
portant in government prosecution.'' Requiring these document by document
Plenson, 560 F.2d 890, 893 (8th Cir. 1977) (dicta), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 996 (1977);
United States v. Beattie, 541 F.2d 329, 330-31 (2nd Cir. 1976); In re Special Grand
Jury No. 1, 465 F. Supp. 800, 811 (D. Md. 1978) (emphasizing the uncertainty engen-
dered by Fisher).
Other lower courts have refused to suppress documents that the claimant did not
prepare. In re Witness Before the Grand Jury, 546 F.2d 825, 827 (9th Cir. 1976); In re
Berstein, 425 F. Supp. 37, 39 (S.D. Fla. 1977); cf United States v. Osborne, 561 F.2d
1334, 1339 (9th Cir. 1977) (attorney-client privilege); In re Fischel, 557 F.2d 209, 212
(9th Cir. 1977) (same). Occasionally a court attempts to follow Fisher carefully. E.g.,
In re Grand Jury Empaneled on January 17, 1980, 505 F. Supp. 1041 (D.N.J. 1981)
(submission ordered because existence, possession and location of documents were
"foregone conclusions").
Other courts have suppressed the documents as long as they were owned by the
subpoenaed party, even though he did not claim to have prepared them. In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum John Doe, 466 F. Supp. 325, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (suffi-
cient risk of incrimination if subpoenaed person's compliance will, in effect, admit pos-
session of documents that might exist); see also United States v. Helina, 549 F.2d 713,
716 (9th Cir. 1977) (reaffirming Boyd and suppressing all documents in the claimant's
possession, Fisher notwithstanding).
In contrast, one panel of the Ninth Circuit refused to suppress documents unless
production would "ordinarily compel the taxpayer to restate, repeat or affirm the truth
of the contents of the documents sought." In re Fred R. Witte Center Glass No. 3, 544
F.2d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir. 1976). If taken literally, this standard would rarely allow
suppression. See also United States v. Authement, 607 F.2d 1129, 1131-32 (5th Cir.
1979) (applied implied admission test when property other than documents subpoe-
naed); Fagan v. United States, 545 F.2d 1005, 1007 (5th Cir. 1977) (construing
Fisher); Kenderdine, The Internal Revenue Service Summons to Produce Documents:
Powers, Procedures and Taxpayer Defenses, 64 MINN. L. REV. 73, 98 (1979) (lower
courts still protect documents under the privilege).
171. The facts in Fisher suggest the Byzantine character of assessing whether
implied admissions are incriminatory. One implied admission was that the claimant
possessed or controlled the summaries. The claimant in Fisher, however, did not possess
or control the summaries; his accountant did. The implied admission was false. Thus,
under the Court's approach, the outcome turned on whether a false implied admission
that was never made would have been incriminatory if it were made and if it were true.
172. Implied admissions will often be unimportant as evidence, especially when
compared to the documents themselves. This suggests two tempting rationales for com-
pelling submission of the documents. First, the court could prevent anyone from using
the implied admissions as evidence against the claimant. For instance, the prosecutor
could be required to authenticate the documents through independent testimony and to
keep the source of the documents secret. Similarly, the court could obtain the govern-
ment's assurance that it will not use the implied admissions against the claimant. In a
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judgments, for which no coherent standards yet exist, puts a substantial bur-
den on the court, especially in cases involving a large number of documents.
At the time these judgments must be rendered, a court will not have, and
cannot feasibly obtain, the information it needs. In a private civil case, for
example, the court must render its judgments when the government is not pre-
sent. In a criminal case, the court must make its decision when the govern-
ment probably does not know much about the documents the subpoenaed per-
son is suppressing. Even if the government knew about the documents, the
investigation is likely to be at such an early stage that the prosecutors will not
know which offenses may be prosecuted or whether eventually they will gather
other evidence which will render the implied admissions "forgone conclu-
sions." Attempting to make decisions early in a civil or criminal case will be
like grasping at shadows, due to the difficulty in determining whether the im-
plied admissions from submitting any particular documents will incriminate or
pose a practical danger or meet any other standard. The claimant will enjoy
the benefit of the inevitable doubts about the application of the privilege which
arise from the lack of information, and he should invariably prevail. 173
third variation, the court simply compels submission of the documents and the implied
admissions, while relying on the claimant's ability to nullify a prosecution by showing
that the implied admissions were used against him. Apparently, the theory is that when
all use of the compelled admissions in criminal proceedings against the claimant is
prevented, the admissions can be compelled. But this rationale contains a fatal flaw:
only a statutory grant of use immunity (as determined by the prosecutor) can give the
court authority to compel incriminating implied admissions. Because compelling the
admissions may prevent a prosecution, it may only be done when approved by the pros-
ecutor. Moreover, the prosecutor must follow the procedures of the immunity statute.
His mere assurance of "no use" is insufficient. United States v. Doe, 104 S. Ct. 1237,
1244 (1984); cf. Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 103 S. Ct. 608, 616-17 (1983) (likelihood
that desired testimony could not be used against the claimant does not warrant compel-
ling the testimony absent an immunity order).
A second alternative, available only to the government, is to grant the claimant
statutory use immunity for submitting the documents. This immunity, however, would
cover only th implied admissions from submitting the documents and not their con-
tents. Doe, 104 S. Ct. at 1244 n.17. However, the difficulty of showing "no use" of the
implied admission means that this alternative may preclude prosecution of the claim-
ant. The government will need to show that it did not use the implied admissions as
evidence or clues and that it did not use them indirectly, in, for example, selecting its
trial strategy or in selecting or ordering witnesses. See Strachan, Self-Incrimination,
Immunity, and Watergate, 56 TEx. L. REv. 791, 810-31 (1978). For example, the
government would need to show by clear and convincing evidence that the claimant's
admission of possession had no effect on its planning or its decision to proceed. Since
submitting documents admits not only their possession, but also their existence and
responsiveness, merely authenticating the documents through independent evidence
does not show "no use".
173. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 488 (1951) (claim of privilege
cannot be overruled unless it is perfectly clear that the response cannot tend to
incriminate).
Uncertainties surrounding the procedures for claiming the privilege for documents
also tend to give an individual or sole proprietor the ability to suppress any documents
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IV. A NEw APPROACH
A. The "Sufficiently Testimonial" Rubric
Justice White's conclusion in Fisher that the implied admissions from
submitting these documents would not be "sufficiently testimonial" for the
privilege to apply points the way toward the more sensible and workable stan-
dard advocated here. The "sufficiently testimonial" standard contains enough
flexibility to allow for the play of the policies behind the privilege. By its
terms, the "sufficiently testimonial" standard acknowledges that in light of
policy considerations, certain actions may be compelled, even though doing so
inevitably compels some incriminatory implied admissions which are testimo-
nial. By conceding some testimonial aspects to the compelled submission of
documents or other property, the "sufficiently testimonial" standard admits
that the reasons for denying the privilege are deeper and more complex than
the testimonial/non-testimonial distinction suggests.
This standard would allow the Court to hold generally that the implied
in their possession. For instance, lower courts have not required a person who has with-
held documents on grounds of privilege to inform the party who submitted the FED. R.
Civ. P. 30 Request for Documents or the subpoena that some documents have been
withheld. Even if the party requesting the documents asks whether any documents were
withheld under a claim of privilege, it is not clear that the claimant will be penalized
for failing to answer. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GRAND JURY PRACTICE
MANUAL 86 n.20 (1975); Fairman, The Antitrust Grand Jury: Representing the Cor-
poration, 13 LAw NOTES 45, 47 (1977). A few courts, however, have held that the
claimant must indicate that he is withholding documents on the grounds of privilege
and must attempt to identify the documents in camera. See In re Bon Voyage Travel
Agency, 449 F. Supp. 250, 253 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Sperry Rand Corp. v. IBM Corp., 45
F.R.D. 287, 291 (D. Del. 1968); J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 45.05[1]
(2d ed. 1976).
This uncertainty gives the claimant substantial advantages. There is no reason why
a person who wants to withhold privileged documents should indicate that the docu-
ments exist but are being withheld. It is better to let the requesting party assume that
the documents submitted are the only ones responsive to the subpoena or Rule 30 re-
quest. This uncertainty lays a trap for the requesting party not versed in procedural
niceties, and it requires all requesting parties to ask whether any documents were with-
held. When the subpoenaed party does not follow up with an assurance that nothing
was withheld, the requesting party should be suspicious. At that point, he may be able
to persuade a court to force the subpoenaed party to reveal whether documents have
been withheld, and if so, to describe them generally. E.g., United States v. 62.50 Acres
of Land, 23 F.R.D. 287, 289 (N.D. Ohio 1959) (court ordered identification of docu-
ments by interrogatories).
Another procedural rule assisting the claimant provides that the claimant cannot
be held in contempt for failure to respond to a subpoena for documents as long as any
of the documents requested are privileged. As a result, a subpoena requesting corre-
spondence or memoranda can initially be resisted in toto, even though some of the
documents requested are not privileged. See, e.g., Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States
341 U.S. 214, 221 (1951); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 601 F.2d 162, 172
(5th Cir. 1979) (contempt conviction overturned because subpoena asked for docu-
ments that included items protected by work-product privilege).
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admissions from submitting documents or other property are insufficiently tes-
timonial to trigger the protection of privilege. The only exception should arise
in the rare and easily identifiable case where the language of the subpoena
discloses on its face that the implied admissions from submitting the materials
requested will necessarily establish the elements of a crime. This rare situation
should arise only when the subpoena requests material the mere possession of
which is criminal. Only then will compelling the implied admissions from sub-
mitting documents, "reduce the accusatorial system to a mere ritual." 17' In
other words, in this rare situation, compelling the implied admissions will seri-
ously offend the policy of maintaining the proper balance of advantages be-
tween the state and the individual suspect, a major policy behind the privilege.
In all other situations, subpoenas for documents and other property should be
enforced over a fifth amendment claim, without a laborious inquiry into the
particular documents or the particular implied admissions.
This proposed rule draws support from past cases, from application of
policies behind the privilege, and from a realization that all other holdings
force standards upon the lower courts that they cannot sensibly administer.
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Byers suggests the analysis supporting
the proposed rule.17 5 Harlan acknowledged that the implied admissions com-
pelled by forcing a person in an accident to stop and identify himself will be
highly incriminatory in some instances. He evaluated whether compelling the
implied admissions would offend the policies behind the privilege.'7 6 For in-
stance, he felt the preference for an adversary system reflected in the policy of
maintaining the proper state-individual balance would not be seriously under-
mined by compelling these disclosures. State prosecutors and investigators
would still need to put forth a substantial effort in order to obtain a convic-
tion.1 77 If the implied admissions from compelled acts so completely establish
guilt that the accusatorial system which the privilege is supposed to secure is
174. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 456 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
175. See Byers, 402 U.S. at 434-58 (Harlan, J., concurring).
176. Id. at 449. The Chief Justice adopted the same approach:
Whenever the Court is confronted with the question of a compelled disclosure
that has an incriminating potential, the judicial scrutiny is invariably a close
one. Tension between the State's demand for disclosures and the protection of
the right against self-incrimination is likely to give rise to serious questions.
Inevitably these must be resolved in terms of balancing the public need on the
one hand, and the individual claim to constitutional protections on the other;
neither interest can be treated lightly.
Id. at 427. The Chief Justice was not as willing, however, to acknowledge that compel-
ling a person involved in an accident causing property damage to stop and identify
himself produced implied admissions that were testimonial, and under Hoffman, in-
criminating. Id. at 431-34.
177. The Justice Harlan stated that "the State must still bear the burden of
making the main evidentiary case against Byers. . . .To characterize this burden as a
merely ritualistic confirmation of the "conviction" secured through compliance with the
reporting requirement in issue would be a gross distortion of reality. . . . Id at 457-58
(Harlan, J., concurring).
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"reduced to a mere ritual," compelling the acts would seriously offend the
policies behind the privilege.' 78
Justice Harlan next considered the interest in compelling the acts which
carry the implied admissions. In Byers, he concluded that the state purposes
for compelling this conduct, such as the interest in assisting the victims of
accidents and the clear need for self-reporting to secure these purposes, out-
weighed the harm to the policies behind the privilege.
Applying Harlan's approach, the first inquiry is whether forcing the im-
plied admissions which accompany document submission would implicate the
policies behind the privilege to any significant extent. The answer ought to be
clear. At its worst, forcing these implied admissions is equivalent to forcing
the subpoenaed person to state in an affidavit that the documents he is turning
over exist, were in his possession or control, and were responsive to the sub-
poena. No further questioning or cross-examination is allowed, thus compel-
ling these implied admissions does not invite browbeating, and there is no need
to use the privilege as a prophylactic measure against browbeating. Nor are
these implied admissions the kind of self-deprecatory statements which deserve
our "natural distrust." On the contrary, when a person submits a document,
the implied admissions of its existence and his possession gain reliability from
his ability to submit it. The coercion from having to submit documents plainly
does not reduce the reliability of these implied admissions.
The old woman's policy, which aims at avoiding the cruel trilemma of
incrimination, perjury or contempt applies with greatly diminished force when
the only testimony compelled is the unspoken set of admissions inherent in
submitting a box of documents. Surely, the indignity from having to turn over
boxes of documents does not compare with the indignity of having to admit
wrongdoing verbally. Nor does the submission of documents recall the cruelty
of the rack, the trial of John Lilburn, or any other procedures which histori-
cally led to the adoption of the privilege." 9 A policy which springs from revul-
sion against compelling a confession during legal proceedings applies with
barely perceptible force when a person is merely asked to submit pre-existing
documents. In the words of one commentator, the implied admissions theory
"reeks of the oil lamp.' '180
A final policy concern is whether compelling these implied admissions will
so eliminate the need for further effort by the prosecution that the adversary
character of criminal proceedings will be lost. This concern does not arise in
the normal case where a broad subpoena requests a substantial number of
178. Id. at 453 (Harlan, J., concurring).
179. Cromwell's efforts to obtain the conviction of John Lilburn through self-
incrimination probably constitute the most influential incident leading to the privilege.
See The Trial of John Lilburn and John Wharton, 3 How. St. Tr. 1315 (1637), cited in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 459 (1966); L. LEVY, THE ORIGINS OF THE FIFH
AMENDMENT 390. The cruel trilemma that faced Lilburn hardly resembles that facing
one who must turn over incriminating documents.
180. Friendly, supra note 105, at 702.
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documents, the mere possession of which is not illegal. The implied admissions
of possession hardly make the case; the government still faces the burden of
making its case based on the documents themselves and on other evidence.
This policy is implicated only when a subpoena asks for documents or other
property the mere possession of which is a crime. Then the implied admission
that one possesses the property may so establish guilt that the adversary char-
acter of criminal proceedings is lost. Except for this rare instance, however,
compelling the implied admissions from submitting documents does not seri-
ously offend the policies behind the privilege.
The rule proposed here is identical to the rule which now governs when-
ever the documents of an organization are subpoenaed, and both rules are
shaped by the same policy concerns. Under the current rule, the corporate
custodian must submit the organization's documents and, by oral testimony,
must verify that these are the documents requested. The Supreme Court has
refined the rule by holding that no further testimony, such as testimony about
the location of documents not submitted, may be compelled. 81 As a policy
matter, merely compelling these prefunctory verifying and identifying state-
ments by the custodian (or under the proposed rule, by the claimant) does not
invite a browbeating cross-examination and should mark the end of the indi-
vidual's participation in the trial or investigation. Compelling further testi-
mony or cross-examination would compromise the policies behind the privilege
to a greater extent.
When the Court has refused to compel acts because of the implied or
explicit admissions accompanying them, the policies behind the privilege have
been threatened much more seriously. In Albertson v. S.A.C.B.,18' the privi-
lege prevented the government from compelling members of a communist or-
ganization to register.183 In Marchetti v. United States'8 4 and Grosso v.
United States,85 the privilege prevented the government from compelling a
person to register as a gambler or to pay an excise tax on gambling.',, In
Haynes v. United States,8 7 the privilege prevented compelling a person to reg-
ister possession of certain firearms which were used principally by persons en-
gaged in unlawful activities.' 88
181. Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957). But cf. McPhaul v.
United States, 364 U.S. 372, 380 (1960) (agent held in contempt for not answering
whether documents were in his possession); United States v. O'Henry's Film Works,
Inc., 598 F.2d 313, 318 (2d Cir. 1979) (no testimony permitted beyond authentication
and identification; however, custodian must give "testimony auxiliary to his nonproduc-
tion"); United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229, 234 (2d Cir. 1929) (same);
Bleakley v. Schlesinger, 294 N.Y. 312, 317, 62 N.E.2d 85, 87 (1945) (same).
182. 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
183. Id. at 78.
184. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
185. 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
186. 390 U.S. at 60; 390 U.S. at 70.
187. 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
188. Id. at 100.
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In these cases, the disclosures were compelled from a "highly selective
group inherently suspect of criminal activities."' 89 Moreover, the evidence pro-
duced by the compelled act would be highly incriminatory in almost every
instance.' 90 By comparison, the group in Byers from whom implied admissions
were compelled-those involved in traffic accidents-was larger and more
closely resembled "the public at large." ' The same is true of the group of
taxpayers who, the Court has found, can constitutionally be required to file
personal income tax returns even when the implied admissions from filing may
incriminate.' 9 ' Such groups are not "inherently suspect," for there is nothing
inherently incriminatory in being involved in an accident or in earning income.
The fact that the matters admitted are not criminal in themselves does not
mean that they are not incriminating under Hoffman; it does, however, speak
to Justice Harlan's concern that if the compelled disclosures alone establish
guilt, the adversary process will be reduced to a ritual.'9 3
Similar concerns distinguish compelling the submission of documents
from compelling the acts and disclosures in the Marchetti line of cases. The
group of people who may be compelled to submit documents includes all par-
ties to civil or criminal litigation, non-party witnesses who may be deposed or
asked to testify in such cases, and all who may possess documents pertaining
to a grand jury inquiry. Plainly, any member of the "public at large" may fall
into this group at some time. Whatever implied admissions come from submit-
ting documents would not be compelled from an inherently suspect group. Nor
are the admissions compelled inherently incriminatory. It is not a crime to
possess documents.
Many cases deciding whether an act may be compelled resolve the matter
on a level of generality that avoids case-by-case inquiry into how incriminating
the particular implied admissions of this claimant would be under all the cir-
cumstances. Instead, in Wade and Byers where the acts were compelled, and
in Marchetti, Grosso, Haynes, and Albertson where they were not, attention
focused on the extent to which the implied admissions would incriminate most
claimants, and on whether compelling the admissions would offend the policies
behind the privilege in most instances. For example, in Byers the plurality,
and especially Justice Harlan in his concurrence, examined the extent to
which the implied admissions from compelling a person involved in an accident
189. Albertson, 382 U.S. at 79.
190. "The [Marchetti] Court noted that in almost every conceivable situation
compliance with the statutory gambling requirements would have been incriminating.
Largely because of these persuasive criminal prohibitions, gamblers were considered by
the Court to be a 'highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities.'"
California v. Byers, 402 U.S. at 430 (quoting Albertson, 382 U.S. at 79).
191. See Sullivan v. United States, 274 U.S. 259, 263 (1927) (taxpayer may be
compelled to file return, but may be privileged from making certain answers).
192. See Byers, 402 U.S. at 456 (Harlan, J., concurring).
193. Fisher, in contrast, suggested a case-by-case evaluation of how testimonial
and how incriminating the implied admissions from producing documents would be.
425 U.S. at 409-13.
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to stop, identify himself, and give his address would usually incriminate and
the extent to which compelling those implied admissions would generally of-
fend the policies behind the privilege. Concluding that the harm to the policies
was outweighed by the public interest favoring compulsion, the plurality and
Justice Harlan established a sweeping rule that the state could compel the acts
even though the implied admissions from the acts will be so incriminatory as
to nearly reduce the adverarial system to a ritual in some particular situations.
These cases support the sweeping rule proposed here. For, except when the
subpoena asks for documents, the possession of which is illegal, the proposed
rule would allow the submission of documents to be compelled without a case-
by-case evaluation of how incriminating the particular implied admissions are
likely to be and whether compelling them would offend the policies behind the
privilege in the claimant's particular situation.' 9 '
If the rule proposed here was applied to the document production issue,
the trial court would no longer need to evaluate the incriminatory potential of
the implied admissions which come from submitting each document. The court
could discard the fiction that it can predict whether the implied admissions
will provide practical assistance to the prosecutor. It could avoid rendering
judgments for which it lacks adequate information, an endeavor which only
decreases respect for the judicial system. When a more discriminating ap-
proach cannot be sensibly applied, an approach that provides a clear disposi-
tion is needed.
Allowing a party to resist a subpoena for his documents sacrifices impor-
tant interests. Often other avenues for obtaining documents will not exist. In
grand jury investigations of business crimes where broad subpoenas are com-
monly used, the government will probably not learn enough about the docu-
ments to describe them in the detail needed to obtain a search warrant. To be
sure, the government will be able to obtain the documents over a claim of
privilege by providing the claimant use immunity. As commentators have
pointed out, however, providing use immunity all but nullifies the possibility of
prosecuting the claimant. Providing use immunity forces the government to
prove the unprovable-that it has made no use, evidentiary or otherwise, of
the implied admissions compelled. 9 5 Furthermore, the opposing litigant in a
private civil case lacks the power to either offer use immunity or to obtain a
search warrant, and thus he cannot overcome a claim of privilege. While the
rule allowing documents to be suppressed originated at a time when fishing
expeditions for evidence were condemned and discovery was severely limited,
the rule incongruously remains to block investigations, such as grand jury in-
vestigations, which courts recognize may properly be wide-ranging."'
194. See note 166 supra.
195. The Court has acknowledged the need to allow wide latitude to grand jury
investigations. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 344-46 (1974); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 361-63
(1956); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279-83 (1919).
196. Nevertheless, subpoenas for physical evidence that might incriminate are
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B. The Exception for "Rocking-Chair" Subpoenas
As mentioned above, the proposed rule would allow an exception which
can be identified without document-by-document inquiry and without serious
administrative difficulties. The exception is designed to avoid compelling im-
plied admissions when the admissions will so completely establish the claim-
ant's guilt that they will "reduce the adversarial system to a ritual." For ex-
ample, a person who submits a document in response to a subpoena asking
only for a particular stolen document impliedly admits that the document was
in his possession, was stolen, and that he knew it was stolen at least by the
time the document was produced. These implied admissions in themselves may
establish the offense of receiving stolen property. In general, when the docu-
ments amount to contraband, such that their mere possession by the person
subpoenaed is illegal, submitting them may leave the government with little to
do but ritualistically admit into evidence the harvest of the subpoena. A brief
review of a subpoena should enable a trial judge to determine whether admit-
ting possession of the documents requested would in fact establish a complete
offense.
The problem suggested by this example is not only presented by subpoe-
nas for documents, but by subpoenas for any substance the mere possession of
which is illegal, such as illegal drugs. One who submits material in response to
the subpoena impliedly admits his possession; if possession alone is a crime,
little remains for the prosecutor to establish through the adversary system.
The law enforcement official who issued the subpoena to the suspect and re-
ceived the material in response, need only testify to what he did and observed,
and admit into evidence the subpoena and the response. The government, hav-
ing enforced the subpoena, may sit back in its rocking chair, its case estab-
lished. The person subpoenaed will have eliminated the government's burden
through his implied admissions.
In practice, law enforcement officers have not generally enforced crimes
of possession by sending subpoenas to the suspect which require submission of
the contraband.19 7 If law enforcement officers attempt to compel submission of
controlled items in this fashion, the courts could rely on the due process clause
rather than on the privilege to quash the subpoena. If so, a sweeping rule that
the privilege against self-incrimination does not allow suppression of any docu-
ments or property need not be qualified by even this single exception. Never-
theless, because compelling the implied admissions in these examples offends
the policy of maintaining the proper state-individual balance-a key policy
behind the privilege 98 -the privilege should provide an independent basis for
quashing the subpoena.
not unknown. See, e.g., United States v. Authement, 607 F.2d 1129, 1131-32 (5th Cir.
1979) (enforcing subpoenas for brass knuckles in police brutality case).
197. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655-56 (1976) (adversary system is
the policy behind the privilege).
198. See Byers, 402 U.S. at 450 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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As discussed in evaluating Justice White's opinion in Fisher, the implied
admissions from submitting documents may incriminate in many ways and in
many cases. Only a matter of degree separates any document subpoena from
the case where the subpoena asks for documents the mere possession of which
is illegal. Nevertheless, a principled basis exists for refusing enforcement of
these latter subpoenas, while permitting others to be enforced. Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion in Byers, which focused on the harm to the policies behind
the privilege, suggests the analysis:19 admit that the implied admissions may
be incriminatory, and ask whether they so establish the offense and so remove
all burdens from the prosecutor that the adversarial system is reduced to a
ritual. Under this analysis, it is apparent that a person will rarely establish all
elements of an offense so completely as to eliminate any significant work for
the prosecutor simply by admitting that some of the documents requested in
the subpoena exist, were in his possession and were responsive to the subpoena.
Surely, Harlan's standard is not met whenever the implied admissions authen-
ticate documents that may legally be possessed but which contain incrimina-
tory contents. After all, the issue is whether the admissions of existence, pos-
session and responsiveness eliminate the burden of the prosecutor, not whether
the contents of the documents themselves do so. This is why Harlan's standard
is probably met only when the subpoena asks for documents the mere posses-
sion of which is illegal. That many implied admissions provide an important
evidentiary link may make them incriminatory, but, under Hoffman, it hardly
reduces the adversarial system to a ritual.
The proposed approach should not be difficult to administer. The judge
need only look at the face of subpoena. A subpoena asking for types of docu-
ments without regard to subject matter, such as cancelled checks, receipts,
desk calendars, memoranda, and correspondence between certain persons,
should clearly be upheld. Possessing such documents is not alone a crime. Im-
pliedly admitting that one possesses such documents will not eliminate the
government's work. This is true even though the implied admissions from sub-
mitting certain of these documents turn out to be incriminatory.
Subpoenas asking for documents of a subject matter which is often in-
criminatory should likewise survive attack. An example would be a subpoena
in a price-fixing investigation which requests documents referring to discus-
sions about prices between the subpoenaed sole proprietor and one of his busi-
ness competitors. Possessing documents referring to such discussions is not
alone a crime. Turning over such documents still leaves the government with
substantial burdens. Just as in Byers, where the implied admission that one
had been involved in the accident involving property damage could be com-
pelled because the police still needed to ascertain the details on which any
criminal liability turned, so here the implied admission that one possesses doc-
uments of a potentially incriminatory subject matter still leaves the govern-
ment the burden of ascertaining the critical details. Unless the claimant, refer-
199. Id. at 450-58.
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ring to the subpoena on its face, satisfies the trial judge that the implied
admission from submitting the materials requested in the manner requested
will reduce the adversarial system to a mere ritual, the subpoena should
survive.
V. CONCLUSION
Branches of the law occasionally maintain their structure long after the
philosophy from which they sprang has lost vitality. Once practice becomes
customary, as did the practice of allowing sole proprietorships to suppress their
documents, it may outlast changes in philosophy until the reason for the prac-
tice is forgotten or repeated uncritically. Inertia, stare decisis, and vested in-
terest oppose fresh scrutiny. A current observer, like the lower courts, searches
from property rights to privacy to the implied admissions theory for a convinc-
ing rationale for suppressing documents. The first recalls a lifeless and un-
fashionable formalism, the second collides with other jurisprudence on the
privilege, and the third connects tangentially, if at all, with the policies now
supporting the privilege. The notion born in Boyd-that the privilege against
self-incrimination applies when subpoenas request documents-has not aged
gracefully. In Fisher, the Court recognized that Boyd was moribund but mis-
took the implied admissions theory for a sign of life. The time for a decent
burial has come.
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